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ABSTRACT
THE INFLUENCE OF EXPECTANCY PERSUASION TECHNIQUES ON SOCIALLY
ANXIOUS ANALOGUE PATIENTS’ TREATMENT BELIEFS AND THERAPEUTIC
ACTIONS
SEPTEMBER 2015
REBECCA M. AMETRANO, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Michael J. Constantino
Although patients’ psychotherapy outcome expectations correlate with
posttreatment outcome, there is limited research explicating treatment elements that
causally influence these expectations. Most relevant studies have focused on varied
deliveries of a treatment rationale. Although elements of rationale delivery appear
important for altering patients’ expectations, many studies have been marked by
methodological shortcomings, such as lack of a control group. In this clinical analogue
experiment, I examined the influence of expectancy persuasion methods, delivered in a
video-based presentation of a cognitive-behavioral treatment rationale for social anxiety,
on analogue patients’ post-rationale treatment beliefs, treatment motivation, social
anxiety symptoms, and therapeutic action. One hundred and seventy-eight
undergraduates screened for elevated social anxiety, and matched for sex and treatment
history, were randomized to the experimental (rationale plus expectancy persuasion
video) or comparison (rationale only video) group. Consistent with my hypotheses, there
were significant increases across both groups in anxiety change expectations, perceived
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confidence in using CBT exposure techniques to address social anxiety, and perceived
helpfulness of exposure techniques. Counter to my predictions, no other effects of time,
group, or their interaction emerged for the various dependent variables. Additionally,
exploration of socioeconomic status, conceptualization of social anxiety, and initial
anxiety change expectations as potential moderators of group effects on the dependent
variables revealed no significant findings. The results underscore the clinical importance
of delivering a clear treatment rationale; however, they also suggest that the specific
methods for persuading patients’ treatment beliefs and activities may have lacked
sufficient potency to augment the effects of general rationale delivery.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Patients’ expectations for a treatment’s effectiveness, or outcome expectations,
have long been considered important pantheoretical and pandiagnostic factors in
psychotherapy (e.g., Constantino, 2012; Frank, 1961; Goldfried, 1980). Box count
(Arnkoff, Glass, & Shapiro, 2002) and narrative (Greenberg, Constantino, & Bruce,
2006) reviews have pointed to outcome expectations having a somewhat mixed
association with treatment outcomes, although with more studies demonstrating a
correlation between higher outcome expectations and favorable treatment outcomes than
an inverse or null association. Further, in a meta-analysis of 8,016 patients across 46
independent samples, there was a small but significant correlation between higher
expectations of a treatment’s utility and posttreatment symptom reduction (weighted r =
.12, p < .001, CI.95 .10 to .15; Constantino, Glass, Arnkoff, Ametrano, & Smith, 2011).
Despite the correlation between patients’ prognostic outcome expectations and
their posttreatment outcome, little research has identified treatment elements that causally
influence these expectations. Some early studies highlighted the potential value of
implementing preparatory interventions for influencing patients’ treatment beliefs
broadly speaking; however, such work did not specifically elucidate which methods were
responsible for changes in these beliefs. For example, Hoehn-Saric and colleagues (1964)
developed a pretreatment role-induction interview (RII) to teach patients appropriate
expectations about therapy in the service of fostering adaptive treatment process and
outcome. Their RII had four components targeting various beliefs and expectation types:
(a) a general description of psychotherapy (i.e., broad socialization), (b) a description of
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the patient and therapist’s expected behavior (i.e., role expectations), (c) preparation for
some typical phenomena that were likely to occur during therapy (e.g., resistance) (i.e.,
process expectations), and (d) suggestion that the treatment would be effectual within
four months (i.e., outcome expectations). The results showed that individuals receiving
the pre-treatment RII, relative to those who did not, attended treatment more frequently
and had significantly better treatment outcome. Although the results suggested that the
RII was generally beneficial, the authors did not assess the specific effects of its four
components on patients’ beliefs and expectations, and they did not assess if changes in
such beliefs were responsible for variability in the treatment processes and outcomes
assessed. Moreover, only the fourth component of the RII focused explicitly on outcome
expectations; thus, the findings, while promising, provided little insight into specific
causal influences on patients’ prognostic outcome expectations.
In a later study, cocaine users receiving motivational enhancement therapy (MET)
prior to a course of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) attended more sessions, reported
a stronger desire for abstinence, and endorsed higher treatment outcome expectations
than those participants who did not receive MET (McKee et al., 2007). MET involved
motivational interviewing (MI; Miller & Rollnick, 1992; Miller, Zweben, DiClemente, &
Rychtarik, 1992) techniques to increase patients’ commitment to change. Given that MI
does not focus explicitly on enhancing outcome expectations, the results, while promising
in revealing an effect on process, outcome, and beliefs, did not clarify specific
expectancy persuasion strategies that might causally increase patients’ outcome
expectations.
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There is, though, a small body of preliminary research that has directly tested
whether explicit therapist persuasion strategies foster adaptive treatment beliefs like
outcome expectancies (for a comprehensive review see Constantino, Ametrano, &
Greenberg, 2012). For example, Kazdin and Krouse (1983) examined, in a series of
analogue studies with unselected undergraduates, whether altering the delivery of a
psychotherapy treatment rationale would influence participants’ expectations. They
found, using audiocassette recordings that described clinical case material and a
corresponding treatment approach, that when therapy descriptions were more
“prestigious” (i.e., noting that the treatment was based on scientific research, tested in
clinical trials worldwide, and novel in comparison to other therapies), included vignettes
of successful cases, incorporated technical jargon, or were said to have a broad focus on
affect, cognition, and behavior, they garnered higher expectations for therapeutic change
than when the descriptions excluded these elements. Thus, it is possible that variations on
the presentation of a treatment rationale directly influence the listener’s prognostic beliefs
about treatment. Several limitations, though, characterized this work. For example, the
clinical material was presented to an unselected sample; thus, the material described may
have been salient for some participants, while having little to no relevance for others.
Moreover, with the material delivered in audio-recorded vignettes about other patienttherapist dyads, there was a rather compromised analogy to a personal clinical setting in
which an individual would hear a specific treatment rationale from a visible
psychotherapist about a problem of direct relevance to him or her.
Horvath (1990) attempted to replicate and extend Kazdin and Krouse’s (1983)
work through an analogue study in which audiocassette-recorded treatment rationales
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were varied by therapeutic focus (behavioral only versus broad a la Kazdin and Krouse),
number of techniques presented (few versus many), and length (i.e., number of words in
the rationale) in order to examine the effects of these variables on participants’ treatment
outcome expectations. Results indicated that moderate length rationales (approximately
250-word descriptions) contributed most to raising expectations. Horvath suggested that a
moderate length rationale might be influential because it is clear and easy to understand,
while remaining long enough to be compelling and persuasive. This interpretation is
consistent with the broader persuasion literature, which suggests that people are less
likely to be persuaded by material if it is difficult to understand (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976).
Horvath’s study, though, was marked by the same limitations as Kazdin and Krouse’s
study described above. Further, the rationales in both studies were extremely brief (less
than 400 words each), which also limits generalizability to real-world clinical exchanges
in which a therapist often spends substantial time reviewing the rationale underlying a
given treatment.
Several other studies have also supported the influence of elements of rationale
presentation on participants’ outcome expectations. Rosen (1975) conducted an analogue
study in which undergraduate students rated their fear of snakes and then received a
description of systematic desensitization with the addition of positive expectancy
instructions (in which participants were led to believe that fear reduction was likely),
negative expectancy instructions (in which participants were led to believe that fear
reduction was unlikely), or no expectancy instructions. Varying the therapeutic rationales
with different expectancy instructions influenced patients’ expectations about the
treatment’s effectiveness; participants who received the positive expectancy instructions
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reported having more positive expectations than those who received the negative
expectancy instructions. Another analogue experiment examined the effects of brief
treatment rationales for different therapy types (i.e., psychoanalytic, rationale-emotive
therapy, behavior therapy) on participants’ treatment beliefs; there was also a no rationale
control condition (Wollersheim, Brodewick, Knapp, McLellarn, & Paul, 1982).
Participants in the behavior therapy and the no rationale control condition reported more
confidence in treatment success than participants in the rationale-emotive therapy
condition. These studies had similar limitations to the Kazdin and Krouse (1983) and
Horvath (1990) studies; that is, unselected samples, compromised personal clinical
analogy, and, in the case of Wollersheim et al., very brief rationales.
In a more recent analogue study with a selected (for elevated social anxiety)
undergraduate sample, Ahmed and Westra (2009) examined whether simply providing a
systematic rationale of CBT for social anxiety would increase participants’ expectations
for therapeutic change from pre- to post-rationale presentation. Results showed that
participants’ expectations for being able to manage their anxiety increased post-rationale.
Moreover, positive response to the treatment rationale was associated with participants
taking CBT-consistent therapeutic action (i.e., self-generated exposures to anxietyprovoking interpersonal situations) by a follow-up assessment; that is, greater postrationale exposure confidence and perceived helpfulness of exposure exercises were
related to more interpersonal exposures by 1-month follow-up. These results further
support the notion that treatment rationales may influence patients’ outcome
expectations. They also suggest that response to a rationale may influence treatmentconsistent behavior. Although this study had several virtues (e.g., selected sample,

5

follow-up assessment of therapeutic action), it also lacked a comparison group, which
made it impossible to rule out other explanations for pre- to post-rationale expectancy
change, such as social desirability or experimental demand characteristics.
The studies reviewed above collectively suggest the potential clinical importance
of treatment rationales, and varied elements of them, for altering treatment beliefs. Given
that rationales are typically intended to (a) help people develop an understanding of their
problems, which may have been previously unnamed, (b) present a potential method for
reducing or eliminating their problems, and (c) educate them about the utility of the
particular treatment, it appears likely that they help foster a sense of remoralization—a
state most prominently reflected in heightened expectation for adaptive change (Frank,
1961; Frank & Frank, 1991). Yet, despite the apparent clinical relevance of individuals’
treatment beliefs, expectations have largely remained an undervalued psychotherapy
variable both clinically and conceptually (Constantino & Westra, 2012; Weinberger &
Eig, 1999). Such undervaluing may partially be a function of the relatively small research
base that, to date, has been marked with several methodological shortcomings. Thus, with
the present study, I attempted to replicate and extend aspects of the most rigorous prior
research (i.e., Ahmed & Westra, 2009; Horvath, 1990; Kazdin & Krouse, 1983) by
addressing some of those methodological limitations.
Specifically, I conducted an analogue experiment to examine the influence of
specific expectancy persuasion methods, culled from the extant empirical literature and
delivered in the context of a video-based presentation of a CBT rationale for social
anxiety, primarily on (a) anxiety change expectations, (b) perceived confidence in
conducting CBT exposure techniques to address social anxiety, and (c) perceived
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helpfulness of exposure techniques. This study focused on these three primary variables
in order to replicate the work of Ahmed and Westra (2009). I secondarily examined the
influence of expectancy persuasion methods on other potentially related treatment beliefs
(i.e., general psychotherapy outcome expectations, perceived treatment credibility,
perceived therapist expertness, and attitudes toward seeking psychological help), CBTspecific therapeutic actions and general therapeutic actions taken by a follow-up period,
motivation for treatment, and social anxiety. A selected sample of undergraduate
participants with elevated social anxiety was randomly assigned to the expectancyaugmented rationale condition or to a comparison condition that included the same
presentation of the treatment rationale without the expectancy elements. This study
focused on a CBT rationale for social anxiety in order to replicate Ahmed and Westra’s
work and because elevated social anxiety is common among college students. Reflected
in the summary above are several key strengths to the present analogue design, which
offer improvements over the collective extant literature. These include: (a) a comparison
group to allow for testing the causal specificity of the expectancy persuasion methods, (b)
a selected sample, which ensures that the clinical material delivered in the context of the
treatment rationale has high salience for the participants, (c) a video presentation of the
rationale, which allows for virtual exposure to a psychotherapist and contributes to a
more clinically analogous context, and (d) lengthier rationales (over 3,000 words and
approximately 20 min in length), which more closely approximates clinical reality.
I expected that across groups there would be an increase in participants’ (a)
specific expectations for being able to change their anxiety, (b) perceived confidence in
conducting CBT exposure techniques to address social anxiety, and (c) perceived
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helpfulness of exposure techniques from pre- to post-rationale presentation (time 1 to
time 2), which would replicate Ahmed and Westra’s (2009) findings. As an extension of
their work, I examined those same variables across three time points (including a longerterm follow up); I hypothesized that participants in the expectancy persuasion group,
relative to those in the comparison group, would report more adaptive changes in those
variables across the three time points. Secondarily, I also expected that individuals in the
expectancy persuasion group, relative to those in the comparison group, would evidence
more adaptive changes across the three time points on other related treatment beliefs,
treatment motivation, and social anxiety. I also predicted that experimental group
participants would report more specific and general therapeutic actions taken by the
follow-up period relative to comparison group participants.
I also explored socioeconomic status (SES), conceptualization of social anxiety,
and initial level of anxiety change expectations as potential moderators of the impact of
rationale condition on the three primary dependent variables. I explored these variables as
potential moderators for multiple reasons. First, it is possible that lower SES participants
may derive a greater benefit from the expectancy persuasion strategies than higher SES
participants because they may have had less exposure to psychotherapy in person or
through various media types. Thus, they may be more open to influence and gain the
most new knowledge from the video, which may in turn promote more favorable changes
in the dependent variables (relative to higher SES participants who may have been more
familiar with psychotherapy in general and possibly CBT in particular, thus rendering the
expectancy persuasion strategies less necessary). Second, given the video’s focus on a
psychosocial approach to treating social anxiety, it is plausible that the expectancy
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persuasion strategies may have an impact only for those participants who conceptualize
their social anxiety as being related to psychological causes (e.g., emotions, thoughts, and
interpersonal factors), as opposed to more biological or situational causes. Lastly,
presenting levels of anxiety change expectations may emerge as a specific condition
under which the expectancy persuasion techniques will be effective. Specifically,
participants with an initially low level of anxiety change expectations may have more
room to benefit from the expectancy persuasion techniques than those individuals with
initially high expectations.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Overview
Data were collected over the course of three academic semesters (Spring 2013,
Fall 2014, Spring 2014). Eligible participants were undergraduates at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst identified through the Psychology Department prescreening
protocol. Inclusion criteria required: (a) scoring above a clinical cutoff for elevated social
anxiety, and (b) endorsing a subjective sense of struggling with social anxiety (to confirm
that participants believed that social anxiety was personally relevant). The measures for
these two inclusion domains are described below.
To determine sample size, I conducted a power analysis for an analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) with main effects, interactions, and covariates. This analysis
revealed a required sample size of 171 to detect a medium effect with power of .90 and
an alpha of .05.
Participants
Participants were the 178 undergraduates who completed the three study sessions
(5 participants withdrew before completing all sessions). The average age of the sample
was 19.75 years (SD = 1.69 years). Participants were primarily female (90%), White
(77%), and single (80%). Descriptive statistics for participant sociodemographic
variables are presented in Table 1 by rationale condition. Sixteen percent of participants
were currently in psychotherapy for any psychological difficulties, 9.5% were currently
in psychotherapy for social anxiety concerns, 47% had previously been to therapy for any
psychological difficulties, and 28% had previously been to therapy for social anxiety
concerns. Descriptive statistics for participants’ psychotherapy history are presented in
10

Table 2 by rationale condition. There were no significant between rationale condition
differences on any sociodemographic or psychotherapy history variables.
Rationale Videos
Two professionally recorded videos (each approximately 20 min long) form the
basis of the experimental manipulation. Across both videos, the same clinician (a White
male therapist who is an experienced clinical psychologist) delivers the CBT for social
anxiety rationale. CBT is presented as an empirically supported treatment for this
disorder, and the clinician reviews both basic information about social anxiety (e.g.,
central nature of the problem, common triggers, avoidance as a primary consequence)
and the central elements of CBT (e.g., exposure to anxiety-provoking stimuli in the
service of disrupting avoidance and promoting habituation).
In the expectancy-augmented video (i.e., the experimental condition), the
therapist interjects into the CBT treatment rationale various expectancy persuasion
techniques that were culled from the small empirical literature on expectancy persuasion
(see Constantino et al., 2012 for a full review; see also Ahmed & Westra, 2009; Kazdin
& Krouse, 1983). These evidence-based methods (albeit limited evidence) include
providing hope-inspiring statements, highlighting empirical support for CBT for social
anxiety, socializing the patient to the treatment process, using technical jargon, and
discussing the broad effects of the treatment (see Appendix A for the experimental video
script).
The comparison condition video includes presentation of the CBT rationale only.
To control for video length, the clinician provides additional examples of CBT and
multiple interim summaries of the information provided. In this video, the clinician
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refrains from presenting any of the explicit expectancy persuasion techniques included in
the expectancy video (see Appendix B for the comparison video script).
Prescreen Measures
To assess for elevated social anxiety, potential participants completed, as part of
the prescreening protocol, the Fear of Negative Evaluation—Brief Form (FNEB; Leary,
1983; see Appendix C), a 12-item measure of social-evaluative anxiety. Each FNEB item
is rated on a scale from 1 (“Not at all characteristic of me”) to 5 (“Extremely
characteristic of me”) with a possible total score range of 5 to 60. To be study eligible,
and consistent with Ahmed and Westra (2009), participants needed to score at least one
standard deviation above the mean of a non-clinical normative sample (i.e., above 43.8;
Leary, 1983). The FNEB is highly correlated with its original version (Collins, Westra,
Dozois, & Stewart, 2005; Leary, 1983), and it has demonstrated high test-retest
reliability (r = .94). Cronbach’s alpha for the current study ranged from .86 to .90. The
FNEB also correlates significantly with social avoidance (Collins et al., 2005).
As a confirmation of the personal relevance of social anxiety, participants
responded “yes” or “no” to the following item: “Some people struggle with social
anxiety, which is a fear of being in or thinking about social situations (e.g., interacting
with other people, giving a speech, being in large crowds, etc.). Do you believe that you
have any concerns about or struggles with social anxiety?” As noted previously, a “yes”
response was required for inclusion. Over the course of the three semesters, 4,646
individuals took the prescreening questionnaire and 844 (18%) met the inclusion criteria.
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Primary Dependent Variable Measures
Expectations for anxiety change. To assess anxiety change expectations,
participants completed the Anxiety Change Expectancy Scale (ACES; Dozois & Westra,
2005; see Appendix D). The ACES includes 20 items rated on a scale from 1 (“Strongly
disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly agree”); thus, the total score range is 20 to 100. The ACES
demonstrated high internal consistency in the current study (αs ranging from .90 to .94),
and has shown good convergent and divergent validity (Dozois & Westra, 2005).
Perceived confidence and helpfulness in conducting exposure
techniques/helpfulness of treatment procedures. Participants’ reactions to the central CBT
procedure discussed in the videos (i.e., interpersonal exposure) were measured with the
Perceived Exposure Confidence/Helpfulness Scale (PECHS; Ahmed & Westra, 2009; see
Appendix E). The scale requires participants to first identify three social/public situations
that they tend to avoid or endure with high anxiety. They are then asked to rate, on a scale
from 1 (“Not at all confident) to 100 (“Extremely confident”), their perceived confidence
in conducting exposure techniques related to each of the situations they identified (i.e.,
they give a separate rating for each situation). These ratings constitute the “confidence”
variable. Next, they are asked to rate, on a scale from 1 (“Not at all helpful”) to 100
(“Extremely helpful”), the perceived helpfulness of deliberate exposure to each of the
situations they identified. These ratings constitute the “helpfulness” variable. There are
two versions of the measure, one for pre-rationale presentation and one for post-rationale
presentation. The post-rationale version differs in that it consists of abbreviated directions
and it pre-populates the three anxiety-provoking situations that the participant indicated
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in the pre-rationale version (to ensure that they are rating the same situations from pre to
post).
Secondary Dependent Variable Measures
General psychotherapy outcome expectations. To assess general psychotherapy
outcome expectations, participants completed the expectancy item of the
Credibility/Expectancy Questionnaire (CEQ; Devilly & Borkovec, 2000; see Appendix
F). The CEQ expectancy item is rated on an 11-point scale (from 0% to 100% expected
improvement in 10-point intervals) and has been used as a measure of outcome
expectancy on its own (e.g., Borkovec, Newman, Pincus, & Lytle, 2002; Vogel, Hansen,
Stiles, & Gotestam, 2006), possesses good face validity, and has been shown to predict
treatment outcome (e.g., Borkovec et al., 2002; Price, Anderson, Henrich, & Rothbaum,
2008).
Perceived treatment and clinician credibility. To assess perceived treatment and
clinician credibility, participants completed the CEQ credibility scale (see Appendix F)
and the Counselor Rating Form-Short Version (CRF-S; Corrigan & Schmidt, 1983; see
Appendix G), respectively. The CEQ credibility scale is derived from patients’ summed
responses to three cognitively-based items assessing how logical the therapy seems, how
successful they think the treatment will be in reducing symptoms, and how confident they
would be in recommending the treatment to a friend with similar problems. Each
credibility item is rated on a 9-point scale (1 “Not at all logical/useful/confident” to 9
“Very logical/useful/confident”), rendering a theoretical scale range of 3 to 27. The CEQ
credibility scale showed high internal consistency in the current study (α = .82), strong
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item-factor loadings (ranging from .62 to .78 across two studies), and good test-retest
reliability (r = .75 in one study) (Devilly & Borkovec, 2000).
The CRF-S is a 12-item measure assessing client-perceived therapist expertness,
attractiveness, and trustworthiness (4 items per subscale). Each item is rated on a 7-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Not very”) to 7 (“Very”). Subscale scores on each of the
three domains can range from 4 to 28. Total scores can range from 12 to 84. The CRF-S
is highly correlated with the original scale (Corrigan & Schmidt, 1983; Epperson &
Pecnik, 1985). Further, the measure demonstrated high internal consistency in the current
study (α = .92), and the three factors have been supported through confirmatory factor
analysis (Ponterrotto & Furlong, 1985).
Attitudes toward seeking psychological help. Attitudes toward seeking
psychological help were assessed with the Beliefs About Psychological Services Scale
(BAPS; Ægisdottir & Gerstein, 2009; see Appendix H). The BAPS includes 18 items,
each of which is rated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 6
(“Strongly agree”). The scale contains three subscales including “Intent,” which measures
a person’s willingness to seek psychological services, “Stigma Tolerance,” which
measures a person’s negative beliefs about psychotherapy, and “Expertness,” which
measures a person’s beliefs about psychotherapists’ knowledge about the unique
characteristics of psychotherapy. The Intent subscale includes six items and has a total
score range of 6 to 36, the Stigma Tolerance subscale includes eight items with a total
score range of 8 to 48, and the Expertness subscale has four items with a total score range
of 4 to 24. Higher scores on all three subscales indicate a more positive attitude (i.e., high
likelihood of seeking services if needed, low stigma related to seeking psychological
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services, and belief that psychologists are knowledgeable and helpful to those suffering
from psychological difficulties). The BAPS total score showed high internal consistency
in this study (αs ranging from .87 to .89).
Specific therapeutic actions. To assess CBT-specific therapeutic actions (i.e., selfgenerated interpersonal exposures), participants completed the Interpersonal Exposure
Frequency Scale (Ahmed & Westra, 2009; see Appendix I). Ahmed and Westra
developed this scale to assess the frequency with which subjects exposed themselves to
interpersonal situations following the presentation of a treatment rationale. Participants
are presented with the same three anxiety-provoking situations that they indicated on the
Perceived Exposure
Confidence/Helpfulness Scale (discussed previously) and asked to rate on a scale from 1
(“Not at all”) to 10 (“Very often”) how often they put themselves in these anxietyprovoking situations in the service of eventually reducing their anxiety. The three items
are then summed to create a total score (range of 3 to 30), with higher scores indicating
more exposure frequency.
General therapeutic actions. Participants completed the following study-specific
item that assessed their general treatment-seeking behavior: “Since participating in the
second session of this study approximately two weeks ago, to what degree have you
taken any actions toward seeking therapy?” The responses include: 0 (“No actions
taken”), 1 (“Looked up information on the Internet [or elsewhere] related to seeking
therapy”), 2 (“Called one or more places to see if they are taking new clients”), 3 (“Made
an appointment for therapy”), and 4 (“Attended one or more therapy sessions”). Thus,
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higher scores indicate progressively more intense actions toward seeking psychotherapy
were taken.
To further assess therapeutic action, participants responded (yes/no) post-rationale
to whether they would like to receive a referral list of local clinicians who provide CBT
(see Appendix J).
Motivation for future engagement in psychotherapy. To assess motivation for
future psychotherapy engagement, participants completed the 4-item Intrinsic Motivation
subscale of the Client Motivation for Therapy Scale (CMOTS; Pelletier, Tuson, &
Haddad, 1997; see Appendix K). Each item rated is on a 7-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (“Does not correspond at all”) to 7 (“Corresponds exactly”), yielding a score
range of 4 to 28 (higher scores reflect higher levels of motivation). The complete scale
measures six types of motivation that underlie Deci and Ryan’s (1985) Self
Determination Theory, including amotivation, external regulation, introjected regulation,
identified regulation, integrated regulation, and intrinsic motivation. Again, only the
intrinsic motivation was used in the present study. Pelletier et al. (1997) found that the
scale possesses good convergent and divergent validity and good factor structure. The
measure showed good internal consistency in this study (αs ranging from .82 to .86).
Social anxiety. Social anxiety was measured with the FNEB (described
previously).
Baseline Covariates
The three covariates determined a priori are described below. Other variables that
were significantly correlated with a dependent variable at time 1 were added as covariates
in the corresponding primary statistical models (see results section below).
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General distress. To assess for general presenting distress, participants completed
the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983; see Appendix L), a
53-item measure of global psychopathology. The 5-point scale ranges from 0 (“Not at
all”) to 4 (“Extremely”), with higher scores reflecting more psychiatric distress (possible
range of 0 to 212). The BSI possesses excellent convergent and construct validity
(Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983). The measure showed high internal consistency in this
study (α = .97).
General mood state. To assess for general mood state, participants completed the
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; see
Appendix M). The PANAS includes two 10-item mood scales, one of which measures
positive affect (PA) and the other negative affect (NA). The items are on a 5-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (“Very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“Extremely”). Higher scores on
the PA scale indicate more positive affect (possible range of 1 to 50) and higher scores on
the NA scale indicate more negative affect (possible range of 1 to 50). The measure
possesses strong convergent and discriminant validity (Watson et al., 1988), and showed
high internal consistency in this study (αs ranging from .88 to .90 for both PA and NA).
Stages of change. To assess readiness for psychotherapeutic change, participants
completed the Action subscale of the University of Rhode Island Change Assessment
scale (URICA; McConnaughy, Prochaska, & Velicer, 1983; see Appendix N). The
URICA is a 32-item scale that assesses readiness for change based on the five stages of
change outlined by DiClemente and Prochaska (1982). Each item is rated on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly agree”). The Action
subscale includes eight items that assess whether the individual is taking action toward
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fixing his or her problem; the score range is from 8 to 40, with higher scores indicating
more readiness to take action. The scale showed high internal consistency in the current
study (αs ranging from .89 to .90).
Baseline Moderator Measures
Socioeconomic status. To examine socioeconomic status (SES), participants
completed a demographic questionnaire that includes a SES item (i.e., annual family
household income; see Appendix O). The item has nine options ranging from 1 (“$25,000
or less”) to 9 (“$200,001 or more”) and was used as an ordinal variable.
Conceptualization of social anxiety. To examine conceptualization of social
anxiety, participants completed a study-specific measure assessing the degree to which
they believe that their social anxiety is related to psychological versus biological causes
(see Appendix P). Each item is rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly
disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”). The measure has four items, three of which relate to
psychological factors (i.e., interpersonal factors, thoughts and beliefs, and emotions) and
one of which relates to biological factors; the score range is from 4 to 28, with higher
scores indicating a more psychological conceptualization and lower scores indicating a
more biological conceptualization.
Initial anxiety change expectations. Participants’ ratings on the ACES (described
previously) were used to examine initial anxiety change expectations as a potential
moderator of the treatment rationale condition.
Baseline Matching Variable Measures
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Participants were matched on sex (demographic questionnaire) and prior
treatment history (see prior history questionnaire in Appendix Q) in the randomization
protocol.
Manipulation Check
To ensure that participants experienced the video manipulation as intended, they
completed an idiosyncratic measure assessing three domains. First, general
comprehension of the video content was assessed with the following yes/no questions: (1)
“The therapist in the video discussed a condition called paranoid schizophrenia” (no), (2)
“The therapist in the video discussed a condition called social anxiety or social phobia”
(yes), and (3) “The content of the video centered primarily around taking pills in order to
reduce symptoms” (no). All three of these questions had to be answered correctly in order
for the participant’s data to be included in the final analyses.
Next, recollection of components of the CBT rationale was assessed with the
following yes/no questions: (1) “The therapist discussed the importance of exposure to
anxiety provoking stimuli” (yes), (2) “The therapist said that avoidance makes anxiety
better” (no), and (3) “The therapist mentioned that research has shown CBT is effective
for treating social anxiety” (yes).
Lastly, recollection of components of the expectancy persuasion techniques were
assessed using the following yes/no questions: (1) “The therapist specifically noted that
over his 30 years of clinical practice he has enjoyed working with people who suffer from
social anxiety because they often respond to treatment and their prognosis for changing
their anxiety is very good” (yes – for the experimental group), (2a) For the first 43
participants: “The therapist discussed how CBT is more than just immediately helpful for
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social anxiety; he made it a point to say that the positive effects of CBT are durable,
which means the effects are long lasting.” (yes – for the experimental group), (2b) For the
remaining 135 participants: “The therapist discussed a method for rating your level of
anxiety called “Subjective Units of Distress” or SUDS” (yes – for the experimental
group)1, and (3) “The therapist mentioned that CBT usually lasts around 20 sessions, but
could be longer or shorter depending on the patient, and that “homework” assignments
are often a part of treatment” (yes – for the experimental group).
We expected the two groups would be roughly equivalent in what they
remembered on the items testing recollection of the general components of the CBT
rationale. However, we expected the two groups to be statistically different on the items
testing recollection of the expectancy persuasion techniques, with the experimental group
endorsing these items more than the comparison group.
Procedure
Potential participants completed the Psychology Department prescreening
questionnaire, including the study-relevant prescreen items reviewed earlier, through a
web-based human subjects system. Those meeting inclusion criteria were contacted by a
research assistant and invited to participate in this study. The study involved three
individual lab sessions.
During the first session, participants completed the FNEB, demographic
questionnaire, social anxiety conceptualization measure, BSI, PANAS, URICA,

Following a first wave of data collection with 43 participants it became clear that item
2a was poorly worded and did not differentiate the groups effectively. Thus, the item was
replaced with version 2b, and the replacement differentiated the groups. See the
“Manipulation Check Analyses” section for the results.

1
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psychotherapy history questionnaire, CEQ expectancy item, ACES, PECHS, and BAPS
(measures were presented in a random order at all time points to control for order
effects). Participants, matched on sex and prior psychotherapy experience, were then
randomly assigned to the experimental or comparison condition.
Approximately five days later (M = 5.48 days, SD = 2.05 days), participants
returned for the second lab session during which they first watched their assigned video
and then completed the CEQ credibility scale, CRF-S, manipulation check items, and all
other dependent measures listed at session one (measures were again presented in a
random order to control for order effects). Participants were also asked if they wanted to
receive a list of cognitive-behavioral therapists before leaving the session; if they
answered yes, the CBT-clinician referral list was provided. All participants also received
a general mental health referral list at the conclusion of session 2 regardless of their
answer to the previous question. This referral list included one no-cost and one low-cost
option for therapy (this was noted on the referral list), and all research assistants were
trained to tell participants, “The first two options on this list provide no-cost or low-cost
services to students.” This was done in order to be sure that all participants knew they
could access care. The time lag between lab sessions 1 and 2 was included to lessen
potential demand characteristics (i.e., that participants would assume that the
experimenters expected their ratings on the primary measures to change following the
video).
Approximately 14 days (2 weeks) later (M = 13.8 days, SD = 2.02 days),
participants returned for their third and final visit to complete the Interpersonal Exposure
Frequency Scale, the study-specific measures of general and specific therapeutic actions,
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and all other dependent measures listed at session 1 (measures were again presented in a
random order to control for order effects). A 2-week follow-up period was used because
it was not feasible to use a longer follow-up period (as in Ahmed & Westra, 2009). The
research assistants conducting sessions 2 and 3 were unaware of the participants’
assigned rationale condition in order to ensure equivalence in the treatment of all
participants.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
First, I calculated descriptive statistics for all study variables, which are presented
in Table 3. The average baseline FNEB score (M = 49.86, SD = 7.27) was comparable to
Ahmed and Westra’s (2009) sample (M = 45.51, SD = 5.08), and within one standard
deviation of the mean for clinical samples presenting for treatment (M = 51.50, SD =
7.30; Collins et al., 2005), suggesting significant levels of social anxiety
symptomatology. Moreover, the average baseline ACES score (M = 73.59, SD = 13.65)
was comparable to Ahmed and Westra’s (2009) sample (M = 72.89, SD = 12.56), and
similar to the mean of clinically anxious samples presenting for treatment (M = 71.16, SD
= 10.88; Westra, Dozois, & Marcus, 2007).
For continuous variables, I examined the distributions, including kurtosis and
skewness values. Descriptive statistics revealed that all continuous variables were largely
normally distributed (i.e., values no higher than 2); thus, no transformations were
performed. There was a small amount of missing data at the item level. Missing
questionnaire items were replaced with the participant’s mean item score on that
measure, but only if at least 80% of the measure was complete before imputation. The
percentages of missing data for each questionnaire, before and after imputation, are
presented in Table 4.
Intercorrelations for all dependent variables are presented in Table 5. The CEQ
expectancy item and ACES were correlated, but distinct constructs. Additionally, the
PECHS confidence subscale developed by Ahmed and Westra (2009) was correlated with
the ACES and the CEQ expectancy item, and the PECHS helpfulness subscale was
24

correlated with the ACES. These correlations support the construct validity of the
PECHS.
Next, I compared the two conditions on all dependent, control, and demographic
variables; the comparisons were done to ensure group equivalence (i.e., randomization
success). Independent samples t-tests (for continuous measures) and chi-square analyses
(for categorical measures) revealed that the conditions differed significantly on none of
the dependent, control, and demographic variables at time 1. Thus, none of these
variables were added as covariates in the main models. I also assessed empirically
whether any demographic variables or any of the three proposed covariates (i.e., general
distress, mood state, and stages of change) were significantly correlated with any of the
primary or secondary dependent variables. The following psychotherapy history items
were significantly correlated with several dependent variables: “Are you currently in
psychotherapy for any psychological difficulties?”: BAPS (r = -.20, p < .01), general
therapeutic actions (r = -.57, p < .01); “Are you currently in psychotherapy for social
anxiety concerns?”: CEQ (r = -.16, p < .05), general therapeutic actions (r = -.38, p <
.01); “Have you ever been in psychotherapy for any psychological difficulties?”: FNEB
(r = -.21, p < .01); “Have you ever been in psychotherapy for social anxiety concerns?”:
BAPS (r = -.16, p < .05), FNEB (r = -.19, p < .05). Note that two outliers were removed
for the correlation analysis with the psychotherapy history item “How many times have
you previously been in psychotherapy for any psychological difficulty (separate courses
of treatment)” because they were more than 10 standard deviations above the mean for
times previously in therapy. Additionally, one outlier was removed for the correlation
analysis with the psychotherapy history item “How many times have you previously been
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in psychotherapy for social anxiety concerns (separate courses of treatment)” because it
was more than 10 standard deviations above the mean for times previously in therapy for
social anxiety concerns. Following removal of the outliers, neither of these
psychotherapy history items was significantly correlated with any of the primary or
secondary dependent variables.
Additionally, each proposed covariate was significantly correlated with several
dependent variables. The BSI was significantly correlated with the ACES, PECHS
(confidence and helpfulness), FNEB, general therapeutic actions, and the referral item (rs
ranged from -.58 to .39, ps < .01); the PANAS (positive affect subscale) was significantly
correlated with the ACES, PECHS (confidence and helpfulness), CEQ, BAPS, CMOTS,
and CEQ credibility (rs ranged from .17 to .35, ps < .05); the PANAS (negative affect
subscale) was significantly correlated with the ACES, FNEB, general therapeutic actions,
and the referral item, (rs ranged from -.29 to .33, ps < .05); the URICA was significantly
correlated with the ACES, PECHS (confidence), IEFS, CEQ, BAPS, and CMOTS (rs
ranged from .17 to .33, ps < .05). Intercorrelations for the proposed covariates and
dependent variables are presented in Table 6. Each variable that was significantly
correlated with a dependent variable at time 1 was added as a covariate in the
corresponding primary model described below.
Manipulation Check Analyses
Regarding the manipulation check scales, all participants answered the three
questions assessing basic comprehension of the video content correctly and, thus, no
participants were removed from the primary data analyses. As intended, the two groups
were perfectly equivalent on each of the three questions assessing recollection of the
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CBT content that was present in both conditions (i.e., all participants across both groups
answered these three questions correctly). Also as intended, the groups differed
significantly, and in the expected direction, on each of the three questions assessing
recollection of the expectancy persuasion content included in the experimental condition
only: item 1, χ2 (1, n = 178) = 50.70, p < .001; item 2, χ2 (1, n = 135) = 48.67, p < .0012;
item 3, χ2 (1, n = 178) = 64.64, p < .001.
Primary Analyses
The primary analyses consisted of three paired t-tests and three mixed analyses of
covariance (ANCOVA). The t-tests revealed significant increases, from pre- to postrationale presentation (time 1 to time 2), in anxiety change expectations, t(178) = -2.31, p
= .02, perceived confidence in conducting CBT exposure techniques to address social
anxiety t(176) = -7.86, p < .001, and perceived helpfulness of exposure techniques t(176)
= -6.12, p < .001, across both groups. These findings are consistent with my predictions
and the findings of Ahmed and Westra (2009). Increases in expectations about being able
to change one’s anxiety revealed a small effect size, d = .11, while increases in perceived
confidence and helpfulness showed medium effect sizes, d = .47 and .41, respectively
(Cohen, 1988).
The ANCOVAs included time (pre- and post-rationale video and follow-up) as a
within-subjects variable (i.e., slopes across 3 time points), condition (experimental or
comparison video) as a between-subjects variable, and any variables that were
significantly correlated with the dependent variables as the covariates. To reiterate, the
2

Only 135 participants completed item 2 because, as noted, following a first wave of data
collection with 43 participants, it became clear that an initial version of item 2 was poorly
worded and did not differentiate the groups effectively. Thus, the item was replaced for
the remaining data collection (and it is the second version of the item data analyzed here).
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primary dependent variables were post-rationale treatment beliefs (i.e., anxiety change
expectations, perceived confidence in conducting CBT exposure techniques to address
social anxiety, and perceived helpfulness of exposure techniques). The ANCOVA results
are shown in Table 7. Note that sphericity could not be assumed for perceived
helpfulness of CBT exposure techniques, so a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
Consistent with my prediction, there was a significant main effect of time on anxiety
change expectations; that is, across both conditions, participants reported a significant
increase in these expectations after watching a rationale video. The test of within-subject
contrasts revealed that the effect was linear, F(1, 172) = 4.19, p = .042, partial η2 = .02.
Also consistent with my prediction, there was a significant main effect of time on
perceived confidence in conducting CBT exposure techniques and perceived helpfulness
of exposure techniques; that is, across both conditions, participants reported a significant
increase in their perceptions after watching a rationale video. The test of within-subject
contrasts for perceived confidence revealed both a significant linear, F(1, 171) = 16.67, p
< .001, partial η2 = .09, and quadratic, F(1, 171) = 4.29, p = .04, partial η2 = .02, effect.
Descriptively, there appeared to be a steep linear increase from time 1 to time 2 and a less
pronounced increase between time 2 and time 3. The test of within-subject contrasts for
perceived helpfulness revealed that the effect was linear, F(1, 172) = 8.49, p = .004,
partial η2 = .05. Contrary to my prediction, there were no time x condition interactions.
Secondary Analyses
Secondary analyses consisted of four mixed ANCOVAs and four one-way
ANOVAs. The ANCOVAs included time (pre- and post-rationale video and follow-up)
as a within-subjects variable, condition (experimental or comparison video) as a between-
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subjects variable, and any variables that were significantly correlated with the dependent
variables as the covariates. To reiterate, the secondary dependent variables were: postrationale treatment beliefs (i.e., general psychotherapy outcome expectations and
attitudes toward seeking psychological help), treatment motivation, and social anxiety.
The ANCOVA results are shown in Table 7. Note that sphericity could not be assumed
for general psychotherapy outcome expectations and treatment motivation (withinsubjects and interaction analyses only), so a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
Contrary to my prediction, there was not a significant main effect of time on general
psychotherapy outcome expectations, attitudes toward seeking psychological help,
treatment motivation, or social anxiety. Also inconsistent with my prediction, there were
no time x condition interactions.
Given that specific therapeutic actions, general therapeutic actions, perceived
treatment credibility, and perceived clinician expertness were assessed at one time point
only, I conducted four one-way ANOVAs to examine the impact of condition on these
variables with the appropriate covariates added. There was no effect of condition on
specific therapeutic actions, F(1, 174) = .36, p = .55, general therapeutic actions, F(1,
168) = .03, p = .87, perceived treatment credibility, F(1, 175) = .31, p = .58, or perceived
clinician expertness, F(1, 175) = 1.92, p = .17.
As a final secondary analysis with a binary dependent variable (i.e., whether or
not the participant requested specific CBT referrals), I conducted a logistic regression
with the appropriate covariates added, and with rationale condition as the predictor and
CBT referral status as the criterion (1 = yes, 0 = no). The logistic regression model was
statistically significant, χ2(3) = 24.59, p < .001. The model explained 20% (Nagelkerke
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R2) of the variance in referral item status and correctly classified 80.9% of cases. The
Wald criterion demonstrated that rationale condition and BSI did not make significant
contributions to the model, while the negative affect subscale of the PANAS did make a
significant contribution to the model (p < .01); individuals with higher negative affective
scores were more likely to request a CBT referral. Table 8 presents the regression
coefficients, Wald statistics, and odds ratios for each of the predictors and covariates.
Finally, in order to explore socioeconomic status, conceptualization of social
anxiety, and initial anxiety change expectations as potential moderators, I included these
variables as interaction terms in the primary ANCOVA models. The ANCOVA results
are presented in Table 9. Note that sphericity could not be assumed for perceived
helpfulness of CBT exposure techniques to address social anxiety, so a GreenhouseGeisser correction was used. None of the three variables significantly moderated the
rationale condition’s effect on the primary dependent variables.
Ancillary Analyses
In order to further replicate the work of Ahmed and Westra (2009), I conducted
three hierarchical regression analyses to examine whether adaptive changes (from pre- to
post-rationale) in the primary dependent variables were associated with conducting
specific therapeutic actions at 2-week follow-up (time 3). The hierarchical regression
analyses are shown in Table 10. Specific therapeutic action at follow-up was the
dependent variable for all three models, while anxiety change expectations, perceived
confidence in conducting CBT exposure techniques to address social anxiety, and
perceived helpfulness of exposure techniques were the independent variables. In each
model, baseline scores of the independent variable of interest and action toward change
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(i.e., whether the participant was taking action toward fixing his/her problem) were
controlled for. In these analyses, it was important to control for baseline action toward
change while examining increases in therapeutic actions at follow-up. Although the
hierarchical regression models were statistically significant, no model showed that the
independent variables of interest contributed significantly to the variance explained; that
is, adaptive changes in anxiety change expectations, perceived confidence in conducting
CBT exposure techniques, and perceived helpfulness of exposure techniques did not
significantly predict specific therapeutic actions at 2-week follow-up.
Replicating Ahmed and Westra (2009), I also conducted one linear regression
analysis to see if baseline anxiety change expectations predicted specific therapeutic
actions at follow-up. The result was not significant, t(176) = 1.11, p = .27.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to replicate and extend the work of Ahmed and
Westra (2009) by examining how expectancy persuasion techniques, delivered in the
context of a treatment rationale presentation, influence analogue patients’ post-rationale
treatment beliefs, treatment motivation, social anxiety symptoms, and therapeutic actions.
Consistent with my prediction, there were significant increases from pre- to post-rationale
presentation (time 1 to time 2) in anxiety change expectations, perceived confidence in
conducting CBT exposure techniques to address social anxiety, and perceived helpfulness
of exposure techniques, across both groups. Further, across the three time points there
was a significant main effect of time on those same variables. Counter to my predictions,
no other effects of time, group, or their interaction emerged for the various dependent
variables. Additionally, an exploration of socioeconomic status, conceptualization of
social anxiety, and initial anxiety change expectations as potential moderators revealed
no significant findings. Finally, ancillary analyses showed that the primary variables of
interest did not significantly predict specific therapeutic actions at 2-week follow-up.
The findings that the presentation of a treatment rationale significantly increased
the primary outcomes replicate those of Ahmed and Westra (2009), and point to the
seeming clinical value of providing patients with a clear and compelling formulation of
an anticipated treatment approach. Irrespective of treatment type, a clear treatment
rationale lends valuable contextual meaning, and it provides patients with an opportunity
to assess treatment fit and to engage their hope for change (e.g., Anderson, Lunnen, &
Ogles, 2010; Frank, 1961). In many ways, the provision of a treatment rationale may be a
quintessential transdiagnostic factor early in psychotherapy that forms the conceptual
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backdrop of the subsequent treatment process (Constantino, Boswell, Bernecker, &
Castonguay, 2013). These results suggest that for highly socially anxious participants,
laying this groundwork for treatment through the provision of a rationale may promote
increased self-efficacy for managing symptoms, perceived confidence in conducting the
necessary tasks of treatment (i.e., exposure techniques), and perceived helpfulness of
those exposure techniques to address symptoms. The specific finding that confidence in
treatment techniques increases following the presentation of a treatment rationale is also
consistent with more recent work in psychodynamic therapy (Goldman, Hilsenroth,
Owen, & Gold, 2013).
It is important to note that treatment rationale provision did not have a uniformly
significant effect on all dependent variables. Specifically, the slopes of the secondary
variables of general psychotherapy outcome expectations, attitudes toward seeking
psychological help, motivation for future engagement in psychotherapy, and social
anxiety did not change across the three time points. Although these non-significant
findings are somewhat surprising, it is possible that there was something qualitatively
different about these variables in comparison to the primary outcomes. Perhaps the most
persuasive element of this particular rationale was the discussion of the effectiveness (at
least conceptually and logically) of exposing oneself to anxiety-provoking stimuli in the
service of habituation and anxiety reduction. It is plausible that while one could be
influenced to believe more firmly in a conceptually presented treatment technique for
social anxiety, more global beliefs like general treatment outcome expectations, attitudes
toward seeking any psychological help, and future engagement in any therapy would be
less impacted. Further, the provision of a treatment rationale is only a starting point in
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therapy, and changing one’s anxiety symptoms to a significant degree may require actual
active engagement in treatment. It will be important for future research to continue to
examine the differential influences of a treatment rationale, and its persuasive
components, on various types of treatment beliefs and elements of psychological
functioning.
Contrary to my hypothesis, no statistically significant differences were found
between the expectancy persuasion group and comparison group on the primary or
secondary dependent variables. These results do not replicate the experimental work of
Constantino, Klein, Smith-Hansen, and Greenberg (2009) and Kazdin and Krouse (1983),
which suggested that certain expectancy persuasion methods (similar to those in the
current study) could influence positive changes in patients’ treatment beliefs and
psychological functioning. The lack of between-group findings regarding the primary
variables may be partially related to a compromised salience of the expectancy
persuasion techniques embedded within the rationale video. It is possible that seeing a
credible therapist present a CBT for social anxiety rationale, which included a discussion
about its empirical support, concealed the efficacy of the expectancy persuasion
techniques making them less prominent for participants. Put another way, the expectancy
persuasion techniques may not have been potent enough over and above the basic
rationale delivery to allow experimental group participants to benefit from their
influence. From a research design standpoint, this concern might be remedied in future
research by reducing the amount of discussion on the nature of CBT in the control group,
and including the persuasion techniques (i.e., hope-inspiring statements, highlighting
empirical support for CBT for social anxiety, socializing the patient to the treatment
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process, using technical jargon, and discussing the broad effects of the treatment) more
frequently throughout the rationale in the experimental group. Alternatively, it could
simply be that the persuasiveness of a therapy or therapist lies largely in the unenhanced
delivery of a logical treatment rationale.
Another possible explanation of no significant between-group findings is that
there is something qualitatively different about socially anxious students that made the
expectancy persuasion methods less effective. Constantino et al. (2009) studied CBT in a
clinically depressed sample, while Kazdin and Krause (1983) examined an unselected
undergraduate sample in their study. Whereas Kazdin and Krause found that a therapist’s
broad focus on affect, cognition, and behavior was an important component of their
treatment rationale, it is plausible that socially anxious individuals are not looking for a
treatment that will have a broad impact on their functioning, but rather one that will help
them reduce their anxiety in the short term when they speak in front of the class, socialize
at a party, etc. On the other hand, individuals with more diffuse or complicated distress
might be influenced by the idea that the treatment has a broad effect on functioning.
Thus, it will be important for future research to parse out the differential influences of a
treatment rationale on individuals with a broad range of diagnoses (thereby helping to
further contribute to the long-standing question in psychotherapy research of what works
for whom under what conditions?).
Regarding the non-significant effect of rationale condition on the secondary
outcome variables of therapeutic actions, it is possible that the 2-week period between
times 2 and 3 was not sufficient to allow participants to take action toward seeking
therapy and/or exposing themselves to anxiety provoking stimuli in the service of
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reducing anxiety. In this study, a longer follow-up period was precluded because of
feasibility concerns. However, future studies should consider including an extended
follow-up period as was done in Ahmed and Westra (2009).
Another possible explanation for the non-significant between-condition effects on
the outcomes is that there are moderating conditions under which persuasion tactics
would be more or less beneficial. However, my exploratory moderator analyses revealed
that our theoretically pre-determined moderators of socioeconomic status,
conceptualization of social anxiety, and initial anxiety change expectations did not
interact with rationale condition to influence the three primary dependent variables,
suggesting that they may not be relevant when it comes to the differential effects of a
rationale on treatment beliefs. First, it is possible that socioeconomic status is not a
determinant of exposure to psychotherapy, as I theoretically posited, which would
undermine the notion that lower SES individuals might derive greater benefit from
expectancy persuasion methods because they have less familiarity with psychotherapy
and thus have more to gain from the persuasion techniques. Second, conceptualization of
social anxiety is likely a complex variable. Individuals may conceptualize their social
anxiety as caused by a combination of psychological and biological factors. Thus, the
video’s focus on a psychosocial approach to treating social anxiety may have an impact
on all participants, not just those who have a primarily psychological conceptualization.
Finally, I hypothesized that participants with an initially low level of anxiety change
expectations might have more room to benefit from the expectancy persuasion techniques
than those individuals with initially high expectations; however, this was not the case. It
is possible that most individuals who struggle with social anxiety have low presenting
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levels of anxiety change expectations (a characteristic that might partially help to
maintain their symptoms). This would suggest that a majority of participants had the
room to benefit from the expectancy persuasion techniques because few had initially high
anxiety change expectations. Thus, there was not a moderating effect of anxiety change
expectations in this sample. Given these non-significant interaction effects, future work
will need to explicate the precise conditions under which expectancy persuasion
techniques could be most effective.
Lastly, the ancillary analyses showed that the primary variables of interest (i.e.,
anxiety change expectations, perceived confidence in conducting CBT exposure
techniques, and perceived helpfulness of exposure techniques) did not significantly
predict specific therapeutic actions at 2-week follow-up, nor were baseline anxiety
change expectations associated with specific therapeutic actions at follow-up. This is
consistent with Ahmed and Westra’s (2009) finding that post-rationale anxiety change
expectations did not significantly predict interpersonal exposure frequency at 1-month
follow-up, but contrary to their finding that baseline anxiety change expectations did
predict these follow-up actions. Additionally, the results are inconsistent with their
findings that improvements in perceived confidence in conducting exposure techniques
and perceived helpfulness of exposure techniques significantly predicted interpersonal
exposure frequency at 1-month follow-up. As discussed earlier, the 2-week period
between times 2 and 3 in the current study may not have been sufficient to allow
participants to expose themselves to anxiety-provoking stimuli in the service of reducing
anxiety. Thus, it remains possible that a positive response to a treatment rationale would
have been associated with conducting therapeutic actions had the follow-up period been
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extended. As it stands, though, my findings render the literature on this question currently
mixed (thereby calling for clarifying research, perhaps with different follow-up time
periods to compare and contrast).
This study is characterized by several limitations. First, although the addition of a
comparison group was an improvement over previous studies, lack of a true no rationale
control group is still a limitation. Thus, the possibility remains that experimental demand
or social desirability influenced the findings, as opposed to an actual rationale effect.
Future research can reduce the chances of these potential confounds by including a
control group that does not receive a treatment rationale.
Second, the sample was comprised of socially anxious college undergraduate
students, which limits generalizability of the findings. Further, although baseline FNEB
and ACES scores were close to those seen in clinical samples, conducting this research in
clinical settings will be an important next step. In addition, studying non-CBT treatment
rationales, and disorders beyond social anxiety, will uncover whether the findings are
equivalent across treatment modalities and diagnoses.
Finally, based on the lack of between-group findings, it is possible that the
expectancy video was not as different from the comparison video as suspected. If this
were the case, then it would be important for future work to identify how to create
therapy rationales in which the expectancy persuasion methods are more salient for
participants.
Despite these limitations, this study underscores the power of the treatment
rationale by replicating most aspects of Ahmed and Westra’s (2009) work. Further, it
improves upon past research by having used a selected sample, employing a video-based
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rationale, and including a comparison group. The lack of between-group findings does
not negate the potential value of expectancy persuasion methods for impacting treatment
beliefs and actions. Although the techniques used in this study did not have an impact
over and above the positive influence of a treatment rationale, there is still experimental
evidence that these methods can be effective (e.g., Constantino et al., 2009; Kazdin and
Krouse, 1983). Thus, it will be important for future research to continue to examine
psychotherapy-related expectations, and potential persuasion methods, in order to help
clinicians directly influence patients’ beliefs about treatment.

39

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Participants’ Sociodemographic Variables by
Condition

Comparison (n = 93)

40

Experimental (n = 85)

Continuous Variable

Age
Categorical Variables

Ethnicity
Black/AfroCaribbean/African
Asian
White/European
Hispanic/Latin
American
Biracial/Multiracial
Other
Year in College
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
5th year
6th year +
Household Income
< $25,000
$25,001-50,000
$50,001-75,000
$75,001-100,000
$100,001-125,000
$125,001-150,000
$150,001-175,000
$175,001-200,000
$200,001 +

M

SD

Range

M

SD

Range

19.73

1.93

18-32

19.77

1.39

18-24

n

%

n

%

4
10
70
4
4
0

2.3
5.7
39.8
2.3
2.3
0.0

5
9
66
2
1
1

2.8
5.1
37.5
1.1
0.6
0.6

27
32
22
7
4
1

15.2
18.0
12.4
3.9
2.2
0.6

23
23
23
16
0
0

12.9
12.9
12.9
9.0
0.0
0.0

7
8
15
12
22
4
7
7
8

4.0
4.6
8.7
6.9
12.7
2.3
4.0
4.0
4.6

13
7
15
11
14
12
2
6
3

7.5
4.0
8.7
6.4
8.1
6.9
1.2
3.5
1.7
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Marital Status
Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Mother’s Highest Level of Ed
< high school
High school/GED
Some college
2-year college
4-year college
Master’s degree
Doctoral degree
Professional degree
Don’t know/Not applicable
Father’s Highest Level of Ed
< high school
High school/GED
Some college
2-year college
4-year college
Master’s degree
Doctoral degree
Professional degree
Don’t know/Not applicable
Employment Status
Full-time student,
unemployed
Full-time student, employed
part-time
Full-time student, employed
full-time
Part-time student,
unemployed
Part-time student, employed
part-time
Part-time student, employed
full-time

71
14
7
1

39.9
7.9
3.9
0.6

71
7
7
0

39.9
3.9
3.9
0.0

2
14
12
11
30
18
2
4
0

1.1
7.9
6.7
6.2
16.9
10.1
1.1
2.2
0.0

2
11
9
9
29
21
3
1
0

1.1
6.2
5.1
5.1
16.3
11.8
1.7
0.6
0.0

1
19
9
9
21
13
8
7
5

0.6
10.8
5.1
5.1
11.9
7.4
4.5
4.0
2.8

4
20
9
7
19
11
6
2
6

2.3
11.4
5.1
4.0
10.8
6.3
3.4
1.1
3.4

37
51

20.8
28.7

34
47

19.1
26.4

3

1.7

4

2.2

0
1

0.0
0.6

0
0

0.0
0.0

1

0.6

0

0.0

Note. There were no significant between condition differences on the sociodemographic variables presented.

42

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Participants’ Past Treatment History by Condition

Comparison (n = 93)

Continuous Variables

SD

M

Times previously in
1.27a 2.67a
psychotherapy for any
psychological difficulties
(separate courses of treatment)
.60b 1.74b
Times previously in
psychotherapy for social
anxiety concerns (separate
courses of treatment)

Experimental (n = 85)

Range

M

SD

Range

0-20a

1.25c

1.99c

0-12c

0-12b

.76

2.57

0-20

Categorical Variables

n

%

n

%

Participants currently in
psychotherapy for any
psychological difficulties

14

7.8

15

8.4

Participants currently in
psychotherapy for social
anxiety concerns

9

5.0

8

4.5

40

22.4

44

24.7

25

14.0

25

14.0

Participants ever in
psychotherapy for any
psychological difficulties
Participants ever in
psychotherapy for social
anxiety concerns

Note.

There were no significant between condition differences on the psychotherapy history variables presented.
a
Results after removal of the participant who reported going to therapy for any psychological difficulties 100 times.
b
Results after removal of the participant who reported going to therapy for any social anxiety concerns 100 times.
c
Results after removal of the participant who reported going to therapy for any psychological difficulties 50 times.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables by Condition

Comparison Group (n = 93)
Time 2

Time 1

Experimental Group (n = 85)
Time 3

Time 1

Time 2

Time 3

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

ACES

73.99

12.55

75.29

11.89

76.55

11.96

73.16

14.82

74.79

14.62

75.71

11.91

PECHS (Conf)

44.69

20.05

53.31

29.73

58.56

21.47

41.02

20.27

52.51

20.27

56.44

22.13

PECHS (Help)

58.34

24.42

67.15

22.49

65.09

22.85

56.84

24.31

67.17

23.14

64.80

23.17

CEQ (Expectancy)

58.60

21.39

63.01

19.66

63.48

21.51

58.45

22.68

65.18

22.07

63.65

20.17

BAPS

79.59

12.33

82.12

11.27

82.52

12.36

80.94

14.89

83.18

13.69

84.28

13.92

CMOTS

17.78

5.48

18.28

5.45

18.84

5.43

17.33

6.81

18.75

6.15

18.74

6.15

7.05

48.35

8.22

47.97

8.45

50.89

7.41

49.64

7.74

49.11

8.41

--

--

--

10.09

5.60

--

--

--

--

9.46

5.12

FNEB
Specific Actions

48.92
--
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General Actions

--

--

--

--

1.80

1.30

--

--

--

--

1.87

1.50

CEQ (Credibility)

--

--

20.69

4.58

--

--

--

--

20.39

5.02

--

--

CRF-S

--

--

65.39

10.20

--

--

--

--

67.66

11.57

--

--

Note. CEQ = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire (Expectancy Item); ACES = Anxiety Change Expectancy Scale; PECHS = Perceived Exposure Confidence/Helpfulness Scale
(Confidence or Helpfulness subscale); BAPS = Beliefs About Psychological Services Scale; CMOTS = Client Motivation for Therapy Scale (Intrinsic Motivation subscale); FNEB =
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Brief Version), CEQ = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire (Credibility Items), CRF-S = Counselor Rating Form – Short Version.
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Table 4: Percent of Participants Missing Data by Questionnaire

Time 2

Time 1

Time 3

%

% after
imputation

%

% after
imputation

%

% after
imputation

ACES

3.5

0

1.1

0

4.0

0

PECHS
(Conf)

1.1

1.1

1.1

1.1

2.3

1.1

PECHS
(Help)

1.1

1.1

1.1

1.1

1.7

1.1

BAPS

3.5

0

2.9

0

2.9

0

CMOTS

0.6

0

0.6

0

2.3

0

FNEB

0.6

0

1.7

0

2.9

0

Specific
Actions
CEQ
(Cred)
CRF-S

--

--

--

--

0.6

0.6

--

--

0

0

--

--

--

--

1.1

.6

--

--

PANAS
(PA)

1.7

0

0

0

1.1

0

PANAS
(NA)

0.6

0

0.0

0

1.1

0

URICA

0.6

0

1.1

0

1.7

0

Note.
ACES = Anxiety Change Expectancy Scale; PECHS = Perceived Exposure Confidence/Helpfulness Scale (Confidence
or Helpfulness subscale); BAPS = Beliefs About Psychological Services Scale; CMOTS = Client Motivation for Therapy Scale
(Intrinsic Motivation subscale); FNEB = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Brief Version); CEQ = Credibility and Expectancy
Questionnaire (Credibility Items), CRF-S = Counselor Rating Form – Short Version, PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Scale
(Positive or Negative Affect subscale), URICA = University of Rhode Island Change Assessment.
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Table 5: Intercorrelations for Dependent Variables at Time 1

ACES
PECHS
(Conf)
PECHS
(Help)
CEQ
BAPS
CMOTS

ACES

PECHS
(Conf)

PECHS
(Help)

CEQ

BAPS

CMOTS

FNEB

Specific
Actionsa

General
Actionsa

CEQ
(Cred) b

CRF-S b

Refb

1.00

.28**

.25**

.26**

.37**

.26**

-.25**

.08

-.07

.12

.07

-.08

1.00

.56**

.164*

.06

.05

-.16*

.32**

-.16*

.11

.09

.00

1.00

.08

.13

.05

-.12

.26**

-.06

.21**

.11

-.11

1.00

.45**

.38**

.00

.09

.19*

.23**

.18*

.02

1.00

.44**

.05

-.04

.26**

.36**

.19**

.12

1.00

.09

.10

.11

.37**

.17*

1.00

.00

.11

.06

.00

.21*
*
.22*
*

1.00

.09

.04

.03

.04

1.00

.04

.01

.08

FNEB
Specific
Actionsa
General
Actionsa
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CEQ
(Cred) b

1.00

CRF-S b
Ref b

.36*
*

.21**

1.00

.22**
1.00

Note. ACES = Anxiety Change Expectancy Scale; PECHS = Perceived Exposure Confidence/Helpfulness Scale (Confidence or Helpfulness subscale); CEQ = Credibility and
Expectancy Questionnaire (Expectancy Item); BAPS = Beliefs About Psychological Services Scale; CMOTS = Client Motivation for Therapy Scale (Intrinsic Motivation subscale);
FNEB = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Brief Version); CEQ = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire (Credibility Items), CRF-S = Counselor Rating Form – Short Version.
** p < .01
* p < .05
a
This measure was given only at Time 3.
b
This measure was given only at Time 2.
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Table 6: Intercorrelations for Proposed Covariates and Dependent Variables

BSI

PANAS
(PA)

PANAS
(NA)

URICA

ACES

-.58**

.28**

-.29**

.31**

PECHS (Help)

-.19**

.31**

.01

.14

PECHS (Conf)

-.22**

.35**

-.10

.17*

CEQ

-.03

-.19*

-.09

.33**

BAPS

-.10

.17*

-.09

.26**

CMOTS

.12

.35**

.08

.24**

.39**

-.07

.27**

-.02

Specific Actions

.10

.13

.14

.21**

General Actions

.21**

-.02

.15*

.13

CEQ (Cred)

.04

.24**

.08

.13

CRF-S

-.00

.07

-.09

.01

Referral

.29**

.05

.33**

.00

FNEB

Note. ACES = Anxiety Change Expectancy Scale; PECHS = Perceived Exposure Confidence Helpfulness Scale
(Confidence or Helpfulness subscale); CEQ = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire (Expectancy Item); BAPS =
Beliefs About Psychological Services Scale; CMOTS = Client Motivation for Therapy Scale (Intrinsic Motivation subscale);
FNEB = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Brief Version); CEQ = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire (Credibility Items),
CRF-S = Counselor Rating Form – Short Version.
** p < .01
* p < .05
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Table 7: ANCOVA Results for Time (Within Subjects), Condition (Between Subjects), and their Interaction

Within Subjects
F

p

Partial
η2

Between
Subjects
F

p

Partial
η2

Time x Condition
F

p

Partial
η2

ACES

(2, 344) = 3.39

.04

.02

(1, 172) = .19

.66

.001

(2, 344) = .10

.91

.001

PECHS
(Conf)

(2, 342) = 10.55

< .001

.06

(1, 171) = .41

.52

.002

(2, 342) = .78

.46

.01

PECHS
(Help)

(1.76, 302.63) =
5.28

< .01

.03

(1, 172) = .03

.87

.00

(1.76, 302.63) =
.16

.85

.001

CEQ
(Expect)

(1.86, 316.19) =
.01

.98

.00

(1, 170) = .05

.82

.00

(1.86, 316.19) =
.22

.78

.001

BAPS

(2, 342) = 1.46

.23

.01

(1, 171) = .84

.36

.01

(2, 342) = .24

.79

.001

CMOTS

(1.93, 335.56) =
1.69

.19

.01

(1, 174) = .00

.99

.00

(1.93, 335.56) =
1.03

.36

.01
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FNEB

(2, 340) = 1.57

.21

.01

(1, 170) = 1.1

.29

.01

(2, 340) = .79

.45

.01

Note. CEQ = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire (Expectancy Item); ACES = Anxiety Change Expectancy Scale; PECHS = Perceived Exposure Confidence/Helpfulness Scale (Confidence or
Helpfulness subscale); BAPS = Beliefs About Psychological Services Scale; CMOTS = Client Motivation for Therapy Scale (Intrinsic Motivation subscale); FNEB = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale
(Brief Version). Partial η2 = effect size (partial eta squared). Small effect = .01; medium effect = .06; large effect = .14.
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Table 8: Logistic Regression Results Predicting Requests for CBT Referrals
B

Wald

p

Exp(B)

95% CI for Exp(B)

Condition

.74

3.25

.07

2.09

.94-4.66

BSI

.01

3.01

.08

1.01

.99-1.02

PANAS
(NA)

.08

7.30

.007

1.08

1.02-1.14

Note. BSI = Brief Symptom Inventory, PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Negative Affect subscale), CI = confidence
interval.
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Table 9: ANCOVA Results for Moderation Analyses

Time x
Condition x
Income F

p

Partial
η2

Time x
Condition x
SAConcept F

p

Partial
η2

Time x
Condition x
ACES F

p

Partial
η2

ACESa

(2, 330) = .24

.78

.001

(2, 340) = 1.47

.23

.01

(2, 338) =
1.02

.36

.01

PECHS
(Conf)

(2, 328) = 1.39

.25

.01

(2, 338) = .89

.41

.01

(2, 338) =
.98

.38

.01

PECHS
(Help)

(1.74, 287.45)
= .95

.38

.01

(1.75, 297.52)
= .30

.71

.002

(1.75,
298.63) =
2.40

.09

.014

Note. ACES = Anxiety Change Expectancy Scale; PECHS = Perceived Exposure Confidence/Helpfulness Scale (Confidence or Helpfulness subscale); SAConcept =
conceptualization of social anxiety. Partial η2 = effect size (partial eta squared). Small effect = .01; medium effect = .06; large effect = .14.
a
The third moderation analysis for the ACES is Time x Condition x CEQ.
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Table 10: Hierarchical regressions predicting exposure frequency at 2-week follow-up

Predictors

Beta

t

p

.02

.24

.81

.21

2.66

.01

.10

.83

.41

Beta

t

p

.29

4.03

.00

.17

2.32

.02

.12

1.27

.21

Beta

t

p

.23

3.17

.002

.18

2.53

.012

.15

1.66

.09

Block 1
Anxiety change expectancy pre-rationale
Baseline action
Block 2
Anxiety change expectancy post-rationale

Predictors

Block 1
PECHS (Conf) pre-rationale
Baseline action
Block 2
PECHS (Conf) post-rationale

Predictors

Block 1
PECHS (Help) pre-rationale
Baseline action
Block 2
PECHS (Help) post-rationale

Note. PECHS = Perceived Exposure Confidence/Helpfulness Scale (Confidence or Helpfulness subscale).

54

APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL VIDEO SCRIPT
Note that bolded text reflects expectancy strategies not included in the comparison video
script.
[Introduction]
Hello – my name is Dr. William Matthews and I am a licensed clinical psychologist.
Today, I’d like to talk to you about social anxiety disorder, also known as social phobia,
and its treatment. Specifically, I will discuss cognitive-behavioral therapy, or CBT, which
research has shown to be effective for social anxiety problems. We call CBT an
“empirically-supported treatment.” Having been in clinical practice for over 30 years,
I have treated many individuals who struggle with this type of anxiety and I can
appreciate how challenging it can be to live with. That being said, the message that I
want to get across today is that anxiety is very treatable with psychotherapy,
including short-term CBT. A large percentage of socially anxious people respond
well to CBT, and the overall prognosis for change is very good. If you are struggling
with symptoms of social anxiety, you could definitely benefit from psychotherapy.
[What is Social Anxiety?]
So, let’s first talk about the nature of social anxiety. Generally speaking, it is a fear of
saying or doing something embarrassing in front of other people. People with social
anxiety worry a lot that others will evaluate them negatively in some way. For example,
some people might worry that there’s something wrong with their speech, or that others
will make fun of how they look. Also common in socially anxious people is a fear that
they’re not smart enough and that they will say something stupid. Many people with
social anxiety complain that they’re very self-conscious and that this really interferes
with their daily functioning. They also often find that they’re very sensitive to cues that
other people might be giving off, such as when others might be disapproving, confused,
or even laughing at them. However, there is also a good chance that they may be
misinterpreting these cues, or at least exaggerating them.
A common trigger for socially anxious individuals is, as one might expect, being in social
situations where they might be exposed to evaluation or judgment, such as public
speaking. People with social anxiety will often try to avoid anxiety-provoking situations,
such as parties or social gatherings. As you can see, avoidance is a central consequence
of social anxiety. Although it may help reduce anxiety in the short term, it also
strengthens it in the long term. Furthermore, avoidance can be significantly disruptive to
a person’s life. For example, it could limit career advancement, academic performance, or
even relationship quality.
So, what it is the prognosis for social anxiety? The good news is that we have
developed really effective treatments for people who struggle with it. Personally, I
enjoy working with individuals who struggle with anxiety because they often
respond to treatment and, as noted, their prognosis is very good. For example, I
have treated people who have been virtually unable to leave their houses and yet
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they have recovered successfully after a course of CBT. [SHOW QUOTE #1 ON
SCREEN NOW] Thus, any struggles that you may be having with social anxiety are
exactly the type for which this therapy can be effective, and I am confident that if
you were to work with a CBT therapist you would be able to deal effectively with
your anxiousness. But before saying more about the specifics of the treatment, let me
discuss the cognitive-behavioral model (or theory) of anxiety on which it is based.
[Cognitive-Behavioral Model of Social Anxiety]
You can think of this model as a cycle. First, there’s a triggering event, such as a feeling
that you said the wrong thing. Second, such triggers typically give rise to a flood of
negative thoughts and worry. These thoughts often contain a lot of “what ifs,” such as –
What if I embarrass myself? Socially anxious people might also berate themselves by
saying things to themselves like, “I am going to mess up,” or “I’m such a failure.” We
call these maladaptive or dysfunctional thoughts. Third, such dysfunctional thought
processes give rise to various emotions (such as shame or sadness) and physical
responses (such as a racing heart, sweaty palms, or even a full-fledged panic attack).
Fourth, given that these negative thoughts and physical reactions are unpleasant, you
want to get rid of them, which is a natural human response. The easiest way to do so is to
avoid the situation that brought them on.
Avoidance can take two forms. First, a person can stay out of the situation all together.
For example, if you are afraid of interacting with people you don’t know, you avoid
social gatherings. This is an example of over-avoidance. The second kind of avoidance is
what we call subtle-avoidance. When people subtly-avoid, they still engage in the
activity. However, they try to manage their anxiety by changing things or doing things
differently. For example, even though you’re still sitting in a classroom full of students,
you might avoid eye contact with the professor or refrain from talking to classmates. So,
even though you’re not avoiding the situation altogether, your anxiety is still very much
“pushing you around.” Unfortunately, avoidance behavior is not a long-term solution. In
fact, it actually reinforces in your mind that you should be afraid of these social
scenarios, which only serves to maintain, or perhaps even increase, your anxiety – thus
completing the vicious cycle!
Let’s quickly review the cycle. First, there is a triggering event in which you might feel
like you said or did the wrong thing. Second, the trigger gives rise to worry and negative
thoughts about yourself. Third, these negative thought processes lead to various emotions
(such as shame or sadness) and physical responses (such as a racing heart or sweaty
palms). Fourth, you react by wanting to get rid of these emotions and the easiest way to
do so is to avoid the situation, or trigger, that brought them on. Avoidance can either be
subtle, which is when you engage in the situation, but try to change things about it to
make yourself less anxious, or it can take the form of over-avoidance, which is when you
stop engaging in the activities that bring on anxiety. In the end, both types of avoidance
reinforce in your mind that you should be afraid of social situations.
[Spotlight on Avoidance]
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Within the cycle that I have just explained, avoidance is probably the most important
part. You can talk to yourself until you’re blue in the face about how you know the
probability of embarrassing yourself is not that high. However, unless you start a
conversation with a stranger, or walk into that crowd, you will never experience that your
greatest fears are inaccurate. Therefore, avoidance is critical because it is the number one
factor that maintains your anxiety.
Sometimes I will say to people, I know how you can create an anxiety problem. All you
have to do is simply decide what you are afraid of and keep avoiding it. This avoidance
creates a short-term relief – ahhh, I don’t have to go to that party – but, one pays a price
in the long run and it actually increases anxiety in the end.
Avoidance can be a problem for many other reasons. For example, people don’t get to do
the kinds of things that they’d really like to do, such as dating, going to a party,
conversing with people, or getting on a bus and going from point A to point B
conveniently. Often these things are really important to peoples’ lives and avoiding them
can have negative consequences. Thus, a key take home message is that avoidance is not
the solution to anxiety. So, if avoidance is the central factor in terms of maintaining
anxiety, how can we treat it?
[CBT & Social Exposure]
Well, one way to treat it is with psychotherapy, or talk therapy. As I mentioned before,
one type of psychotherapy, based on the model I just described, is known as cognitivebehavioral therapy, or CBT. Many research trials suggest that CBT is one of the most
effective methods for treating social anxiety. With its research-informed and novel
techniques, socially anxious people who participate in CBT tend to get significantly
better than people who simply try to deal with their symptoms on their own. What is
even more exciting about CBT for social anxiety is that this positive effect is
durable; that is, people tend to maintain their gains even after completing treatment
(and they do so more than people who have been treated with anxiety medications
only). Thus, I can say confidently that almost all people experience at least some
benefit after going through outpatient CBT, and a good portion experience almost
complete removal of their symptoms.
CBT is a treatment that will help teach you skills that you can use on your own both
between sessions and after treatment ends. We know that most people can learn
these skills in a fairly timely manner with regular attendance and effort in
treatment. CBT has a broad focus on cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. When
used to address social anxiety, one key element of this approach is called exposure.
Let’s take an example. Suppose a friend came to you with a phobia of dogs and said,
“You know, I can barely leave my apartment because I’m afraid I’ll run into a dog.”
Now, if that same friend came to you and said, “I’m sick of living my life this way, this
dog phobia has to go,” what would tell your friend to do? I might find a small, friendly
dog for the two of us to work with. We could begin exposing this person to the dog on the
other side of the room. Then, we would gradually approach the dog. Once this interaction
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was successful, we might move on to petting the dog and ultimately interacting with
larger, more intimidating dogs.
This is a great example of the exposure portion of CBT treatment. Of course, in social
anxiety, it would take a different form because we would be using social settings instead
of dogs! For example, we might be making eye contact with a stranger and working our
way up to beginning a conversation with a stranger. A central point is that you actually
have to experience your anxiety to get over it – there is no short cut around it. It’s kind of
the opposite of what you might think you need to reduce your anxiety. Doing the
opposite is very hard, and I understand that from watching the people with whom I
work initially struggle through these exposure exercises. I also know that the more
people engage in these exposure activities, the more they learn that their greatest fears
will not come true, or that things are not nearly as bad as they thought. With such
learning experiences, their anxiety will begin to decrease. We call this a “corrective
experience.” Be aware, there is no substitute for being in the situation and feeling
the anxiety. When you are first going through exposure exercises, you might feel like
you are not making progress or that it is counterproductive to induce anxiety in
yourself, but stick with it. I have taken hundreds of people through these exposurebased treatments and they really do work for many people. The more you expose
yourself to anxiety-provoking situations, and the less you avoid them, the more
effective the treatment will be! In this sense, I believe that you have a say over
changing your life and any anxiety problems that you currently experience.
Throughout the course of therapy, if indeed you were to engage in CBT, you would
start to see that you could respond to different situations more effectively. You
would also notice that just because you have done things a certain way in the past
does not lock you into that pattern now or in the future.
There are a few principles of exposure that I want to share with you. First, to be effective,
exposure needs to be done repeatedly; it’s not enough to ride the bus once. Second, it is
important to identify subtle avoidance strategies and to do exposure without those “safety
signals.” Third, it is important to note that physiological symptoms, such as sweaty
palms, are not dangerous. In fact, they can be useful when we are facing a true threat.
With many types of anxiety, though, the threat is exaggerated in our head or not real at
all. Finally, exposure in CBT is often done gradually, like in the dog-phobia example, so
that the anxiety is not full-force right from the start. Put differently, my goal as a CBT
therapist is not to flood you with anxiety, but rather to help guide you through
graded, or gradual, exposures. Again, I am sensitive to the challenge of putting
yourself in these anxiety-provoking situations, but getting through them is exactly
what helps reduce your symptoms.
Let’s review the principles of exposure that I just discussed. First, exposure must be done
repeatedly to be effective. Second, it should be done without “crutches” or “safety
signals” because these are subtle-avoidance strategies. Third, physiological symptoms
that you might experience during exposure are not dangerous. Finally, exposure can, and
should, be done gradually so that your anxiety is not full-blown right at the start.
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Let me share one exposure tool that we use in CBT, which is called a fear hierarchy. A
fear hierarchy can take the form of a list of situations that make you anxious. As someone
who is socially anxious and fears negative evaluation, you might include things like
sitting close to the front of class or making a speech in public. Once you create your list,
you rate your anxiety in each situation on a scale from 0-100, where 0 is feeling
completely relaxed and 100 is feeling extreme anxiety. We call these ratings subjective
units of distress, or SUDS, and we use them frequently in CBT. After you rate each
situation, you expose yourself to the lower-rated ones and work your way up in order to
build your confidence. The idea is to expose yourself eventually to the higher-rated items
and to sit with the anxiety until you feel it start to decrease. From experience, I know
that it will take more than one exposure session to reduce your anxiety to the level
you would like. Although CBT is a relatively short-term treatment, change is not
always immediate and that is okay and to be expected. A vital principle is that you
need to stay with the exposure until you actually experience decreased anxiety (we call
this habituation). Quitting the exposure before then is another form of avoidance, which
would just engage the cycle all over again!
You now know what some CBT tools are, such as exposure exercises and fear
hierarchies. But what is the exact nature of the treatment? Well, CBT for social
anxiety generally lasts somewhere around 20 sessions, but it can also be shorter or
longer depending on your presenting concerns. During the first few sessions, the
therapist will simply learn about your symptoms and your anxiety triggers. Then,
your therapist will generally teach you how to identify your maladaptive thoughts
(those are the ones that tell you not to go to the party because you will embarrass
yourself) and work with you to alter some of those thoughts to be more accurate and
logical. You will also create your fear hierarchy and try to gradually engage in as
many exposure exercises as possible using your hierarchy as a guide. Your therapist
will likely ask you to complete “homework” assignments, which help you to practice
the skills you learn during sessions and are important to your progress. Relaxation
strategies can also be helpful to practice during this process. Engaging in therapy
for social anxiety, or any other difficulty, is certainly challenging. Sometimes it
might feel like you are not making progress or that you are even having more
symptoms than before. Rest assured that this is normal. Like I said earlier, CBT is a
relatively short-term treatment, but change is not always immediate or linear (and
that is okay and typical).
After going through CBT, people tend to see very broad effects. Behaviorally, they
can engage in more activities than they could in the past because they are less
fearful and less anxious. Overall, their mood improves and they have a higher
quality of life. They also see that their thinking has fundamentally changed. They no
longer worry that people at the party are negatively evaluating them; instead, they
think about how fun parties have been in the past and how the anxiety will reduce
eventually (we call this peaking and passing). Research also points to the effects
being long lasting. Like I mentioned earlier, even after treatment ends people
continue to reduce their symptoms further. We believe that this happens because
you will develop more control over managing difficult problems and you will be able
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to rely on your own more adaptive coping abilities. When we start to see changes in
your life, we would focus on relating these changes to your own efforts both in
therapy and outside of therapy. CBT therapists can provide you with tools, but you
are the one who would be using them. With this process, you can build on past
successes and draw on your strengths.
I have discussed a lot with you today. As a quick review, I explained the characteristics
of social anxiety and its triggers. I discussed a central element that maintains the disorder,
avoidance. I also provided an overview of an empirically supported treatment for
addressing social anxiety called cognitive-behavioral therapy, including its key
component of exposure to anxiety provoking stimuli. Lastly, I gave you a quick
overview of what a course of CBT might look like. Now, I hope you can see that
your struggles with social anxiety are exactly the type for which CBT can be helpful.
As I noted earlier, I am confident that if you were to work with a CBT therapist in
the future, you would be able to conquer your social anxiety symptoms. But
remember, you are the expert in knowing yourself, and any therapist would need to
draw on that expertise as you progressed in your work together. As the expert in
CBT, your therapist will be a valuable guide. However, collaboration will be
essential, as only you know your innermost experiences and fears, as well as the pace
at which you change most effectively. I hope that you will consider CBT if your
social anxiety is interfering in any way in your life. I really do think it can help. In
fact, if any of the experiences that I discussed seem relevant to you, you may be
interested in taking action. If you want to look into treatment, including CBT, please
indicate that, when asked, in the survey that you will now complete. We can then provide
you with information.
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APPENDIX B
COMPARISON VIDEO SCRIPT
[Introduction]
Hello – my name is Dr. William Matthews and I am a licensed clinical psychologist.
Today, I’d like to talk to you about social anxiety disorder, also known as social phobia,
and its treatment. Specifically, I will discuss cognitive-behavioral therapy, or CBT, which
research has shown to be effective for social anxiety problems. We call CBT an
“empirically-supported treatment.”
[What is Social Anxiety?]
So, let’s first talk about the nature of social anxiety. Generally speaking, it is a fear of
saying or doing something embarrassing in front of other people. People with social
anxiety worry a lot that others will evaluate them negatively in some way. For example,
some people might worry that there’s something wrong with their speech, or that others
will make fun of how they look. Also common in socially anxious people is a fear that
they’re not smart enough and that they will say something stupid. Many people with
social anxiety complain that they’re very self-conscious and that this really interferes
with their daily functioning. They also often find that they’re very sensitive to cues that
other people might be giving off, such as when others might be disapproving, confused,
or even laughing at them. However, there is also a good chance that they may be
misinterpreting these cues, or at least exaggerating them.
A common trigger for socially anxious individuals is, as one might expect, being in social
situations where they might be exposed to evaluation or judgment. Thus, for many
people, triggers take the form of public speaking, reading, or writing, or just about any
situation where they are the center of attention and other people are noticing them. People
with social anxiety will often try to avoid anxiety-provoking situations, such as parties,
social gatherings, or any places or functions with a lot of people. Some might even avoid
taking classes where they know there is a graded presentation element to it! As you can
see, avoidance is a central consequence of social anxiety. Although it may help reduce
anxiety in the short term, it also strengthens it in the long term. Furthermore, avoidance
can be significantly disruptive of a person’s life. For example, it could limit career
advancement, academic performance, or even relationship quality.
To review, social anxiety is a fear of saying or doing something stupid or embarrassing in
front of others. Common triggers are social situations where the person might be exposed
to scrutiny or judgment. A primary behavioral consequence, which is actually a
maladaptive coping strategy, involves avoidance of social situations. And even when
socially anxious people do not avoid, they often have to endure anxiety-provoking
situations with great stress; which, like avoidance, can interfere significantly with one’s
functioning.
[Cognitive-Behavioral Model of Social Anxiety]
Now I am going to discuss the cognitive-behavioral model of anxiety; you can think of
this model as a cycle. First, there’s a triggering event, such as a feeling that you said the
wrong thing or that someone is disapproving of you. Second, such triggers typically give
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rise to a flood of negative thoughts and worry. These thoughts often contain a lot of
“what ifs,” such as – What if I embarrass myself? What if people see me as a fool? What
if someone doesn’t like me? What if I make a mistake? Socially anxious people might
also berate themselves by saying things to themselves like, “I am going to mess up,” or
“I’m such a failure.” Third, such negative thought processes give rise to various emotions
(such as shame or sadness) and physical responses (such as a racing heart, sweaty palms,
or even a full-fledged panic attack). Fourth, given that these negative thoughts and
physical reactions are unpleasant, you want to get rid of them, which is a natural human
response. The easiest way to do so is to avoid the situation, or trigger, that brought them
on.
Avoidance can take two forms. First, a person can stay out of the situation all together.
For example, if you are afraid of interacting with people you don’t know, you avoid
parties or gatherings. If you are afraid of big crowds, you avoid places like the bus, the
mall, concerts, or sporting events. These are examples of over-avoidance. The second
kind of avoidance is what we call subtle-avoidance, which is very common in social
anxiety. When people subtly-avoid, they still engage in the activity. However, they try to
manage their anxiety by changing things or doing things differently. For example, even
though you’re still sitting in a classroom full of students, you might avoid eye contact
with the professor, refrain from talking to classmates, or only raise your hand when
you’re certain that you know the answer (and, thus, cannot be ridiculed for getting it
wrong). As another example, if you’re on the bus you might be listening to your iPod to
maintain a sort of distance from others. Or, you might go to great lengths to ride the bus
at times when there are few people on it. You might even pretend to be texting when
passing others so as to avoid having to say “hi” or having to engage in small talk. So,
even though you’re not avoiding social situations altogether, your anxiety is still very
much “pushing you around.” The anxiety is influencing you to behave in certain ways
because you’re predicting that bad things will happen in these settings. Unfortunately,
avoidance behavior is not a long-term solution. In fact, it actually reinforces in your mind
that you should be afraid of these social scenarios, which only serves to maintain, or
perhaps even increase, your anxiety – thus completing the vicious cycle!
Let’s quickly review the cycle. First, there is a triggering event in which you might feel
like you said or did the wrong thing. Second, the trigger gives rise to worry and negative
thoughts about yourself. Third, these negative thought processes lead to various emotions
(such as shame or sadness) and physical responses (such as a racing heart or sweaty
palms). Fourth, you react by wanting to get rid of these emotions and the easiest way to
do so is to avoid the situation that brought them on. Avoidance can either be subtle,
which is when you engage in the situation, but try to change things about it to make
yourself less anxious, or it can take the form of over-avoidance, which is when you stop
engaging in the activities that bring on anxiety. In the end, both types of avoidance
reinforce in your mind that you should be afraid of social situations.
[Spotlight on Avoidance]
Within the cycle that I have just explained, avoidance is probably the most important
part. You can talk to yourself until you’re blue in the face about how you know the
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probability of embarrassing yourself is not that high. However, if you are not starting a
conversation with a stranger, or if you are not getting on that bus or walking into that
crowd, it will always be a theory and it will never be reality. That is, you will never
experience that your greatest fears are inaccurate. Therefore, avoidance is critical because
it is the number one factor that maintains your anxiety.
Sometimes I will say to people, I know how you can create an anxiety problem. All you
have to do is simply decide what you are afraid of and keep avoiding it. People with
social anxiety will often find, as they look to their history, that they’ve had to leave more
and more things, or find more and more ways to protect themselves from the anxiety,
which has prevented them from getting better. This avoidance creates a short-term relief
– ahhh, I don’t have to go to that party – but, one pays a price in the long run and it
actually increases anxiety in the end.
Avoidance can be a problem for many other reasons. For example, people don’t get to do
the kinds of things that they’d really like to do, such as dating, going to a party,
conversing with people, or getting on a bus and going from point A to point B
conveniently. Often these things are really important to peoples’ lives and avoiding them
can have negative consequences. To reiterate, there might be some relief in leaving a
party early when you get anxious. However, people often say in these situations that their
confidence decreases or they feel guilty because they think, “Wow, I really should have
stayed and it doesn’t feel good to avoid things because of anxiety.” Thus, a key take
home message is that avoidance is not the solution to anxiety; it doesn’t make it better
and it can actually magnify the problem. So, if avoidance is the central factor in terms of
maintaining anxiety, how can we treat it?
[CBT & Social Exposure]
Well, one way to treat it is with psychotherapy, or talk therapy. As I mentioned before,
one type of psychotherapy, based on the model I just described, is known as cognitivebehavioral therapy, or CBT. Again, CBT is an empirically supported treatment for social
anxiety. One key element of this approach is called exposure. Let’s take an example.
Suppose a friend came to you with a phobia of dogs and said, “You know, I can barely
leave my apartment because I’m afraid I’ll run into a dog, and I just can’t stop worrying
about dogs because they are so dangerous.” Now, if that same friend came to you and
said, “I’m sick of living my life this way, this dog phobia has to go,” what would tell
your friend to do? You don’t have to say it out loud, but just kind of consider that for a
few seconds [pause for 5-10 seconds]. I might find a small, friendly dog for the two of us
to work with. We could begin exposing this person to the dog on the other side of the
room. Then, we would gradually approach the dog. Once this interaction was successful,
meaning that the dog does not attack the person as he or she expected, we might move on
to petting the dog and ultimately interacting with larger, more intimidating dogs.
This is a great example of the exposure portion of CBT treatment. Of course, in social
anxiety it would take a different form because we would be using social settings instead
of dogs! For example, we might be making eye contact with a stranger and working our
way up to beginning a conversation with a stranger. Or, a socially anxious person might
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enroll in a medium sized lecture class with a goal of enrolling in larger classes, or
perhaps ones that require small group discussions or even an oral presentation. A central
point is that you actually have to experience your anxiety to get over it – there is no short
cut around it. It’s kind of a paradox, right? It’s kind of the opposite of what you might
think you need to reduce your anxiety. It’s your anxiety that tries to sell you on staying
away from dogs, or potentially embarrassing situations when it comes to social anxiety,
but in fact staying away is not a solution at all and it actually makes the problem worse.
In a way, the poison is the cure! You have to do the opposite of what your anxiety is
trying to talk you into doing. The more people engage in these exposure activities, the
more they learn that their greatest fears will not come true, or that things are not nearly as
bad as they thought. With such learning experiences, their anxiety will begin to decrease.
The bottom line is that there is no substitute for being in the situation and feeling the
anxiety; avoidance as a coping device does not accomplish the same thing. It only makes
it worse.
There are a few principles of exposure that I want to share with you. First, to be effective,
exposure needs to be done repeatedly; it’s not enough to ride the bus once. It’s like
learning a new skill. For example, if you’re learning how to play tennis, you don’t go hit
the ball once or twice and feel confident in that skill. The same can be said for exposure
exercises. Second, it is important to do exposure without “safety signals.” In other words,
it is important to identify those subtle avoidance strategies, or safety signals, and remove
them while doing exposure exercises. If I’m trying to be comfortable talking to you, but
I’ve turned away and I’m not looking at you, then it’s not really going to benefit me. I
might as well not be talking to you at all because it’s not really going to do anything in
terms of reducing my anxiety about talking to others. Exposure should be done without
these crutches so that you can feel anxious in the situation; it’s a good thing if your heart
is racing, palms are sweating, and so forth because it means the exposure has the
potential to work. Third, it is important to note that these physiological symptoms are not
dangerous. In fact, they can be useful when we are facing a true threat. With many types
of anxiety, though, the threat is exaggerated in our head or not real at all. Finally,
exposure in CBT is often done gradually, like in the dog-phobia example, so that the
anxiety is not full-force right from the start.
Let’s review the principles of exposure that I just discussed. First, exposure must be done
repeatedly to be effective. Second, it should be done without “crutches” or “safety
signals” because these are subtle-avoidance strategies. Third, physiological symptoms
that you might experience during exposure are not dangerous. Finally, exposure can, and
should, be done gradually so that your anxiety is not full-blown right at the start.
Let me share one exposure tool that we use in CBT, which is called a fear hierarchy. A
fear hierarchy can take the form of a list of situations that make you anxious. These can
be situations you completely avoid or situations in which you do not feel comfortable, but
endure them with discomfort. As someone who is socially anxious and fears negative
evaluation, you might include things like sitting close to the front of class, making eye
contact with people you don’t know, sitting on a bus in rush hour, making a speech in
public, etc. The situations you include should be ones for which you eventually want to
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create an exposure exercise. Once you create your list, you rate your anxiety in each
situation on a scale from 0-100, where 0 is feeling completely relaxed and 100 is feeling
extreme anxiety. There are no rules about how many situations you can add to your list,
they should just be situations out of which you will create exposure exercises in the
future. The goal is to get in the habit of doing exposures and facing your anxiety.
Therefore, after you rate each situation, you expose yourself to the lower-rated ones and
work your way up in order to build your confidence. However, doing anything rated
below a 50 is probably not worth doing because your anxiety isn’t high enough in those
situations to make a real difference in your life. The idea is to expose yourself to the
higher-rated items and sit with the anxiety until you feel it start to decrease. It will likely
take more than one exposure session to reduce your anxiety to a level you would like.
During the exposures you can talk to yourself and do deep-breathing exercises to stay
calm. Whatever it looks like, though, a vital principle is that you need to stay with the
exposure until you actually experience decreased anxiety. Quitting the exposure before
then is another form of avoidance, which would just engage the cycle all over again!
I have discussed a lot with you today. Now would be a good time to reflect on what I
have said [pause 1-2 seconds]. As a quick review, I explained the characteristics of social
anxiety and its triggers. Social anxiety is a fear of saying or doing something
embarrassing in front of other people. People with social anxiety are afraid that others
will find fault with them. They worry a lot that others will evaluate them negatively in
some way. For example, some people might worry that there’s something wrong with
their speech, or that others will make fun of how they look. Also common in socially
anxious people is a fear that they’re not smart enough and that they will say something
stupid, causing others to ridicule them or to lose respect for them. Many people with
social anxiety complain that they’re very self-conscious and that this really interferes
with their daily functioning. Common triggers for socially anxious people are: going to
parties, speaking in front of groups, and riding public transportation.
I also discussed a central element that maintains the disorder, avoidance. This avoidance
sacrifices long-term well being for short-term relief (while this may seem like a good
proposition in the moment, it ends up being quite an obstacle in the long run). Avoidance
can either be subtle, which is when you engage in the situation but try to change things
about it to make yourself less uncomfortable, or it can take the form of over-avoidance,
which is when you stop engaging in the activities that bring on anxiety.
Finally, I provided an overview of an empirically supported treatment for addressing
social anxiety called cognitive-behavioral therapy, or CBT, including its key component
of exposure to anxiety provoking stimuli. Remember, exposure should be done
repeatedly (it’s not enough to ride the bus once), gradually (because we don’t want all of
your anxiety to flood you during your first exposure exercise), and without the use of
safety signals (because using such signals means you are engaging in subtle avoidance).
One last thing – if any of the experiences that I discussed seem relevant to you, you may
be interested in taking action. In fact, if you want to look into treatment, including CBT,
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please indicate that, when asked, in the survey that you will now complete. We can then
provide you with information.
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APPENDIX C
FEAR OF NEGATIVE EVALUATION SCALE – BRIEF (FNEB)
Read each of the following statements carefully and indicate how characteristic it is of
you according to the following scale:
1 - Not at all characteristic of me
2 - Slightly characteristic of me
3 - Moderately characteristic of me
4 - Very characteristic of me
5 - Extremely characteristic of me

_____ 1. I worry about what other people will think of me even when I know it doesn't
make any difference.
_____ 2. I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming an unfavorable
impression of me.
_____ 3. I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings.
_____ 4. I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making on someone.
_____ 5. I am afraid others will not approve of me.
_____ 6. I am afraid that people will find fault with me.
_____ 7. Other people's opinions of me do not bother me.
_____ 8. When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may be thinking about
me.
_____ 9. I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make.
_____ 10. If I know someone is judging me, it has little effect on me.
_____ 11. Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think of me.
_____ 12. I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things.
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APPENDIX D
ANXIETY CHANGE EXPECTANCY SCALE (ACES)
Listed below are a number of statements concerning beliefs about change. Please read
each item carefully and circle one of the five options that best reflect how you feel about
the statement right now.
1 – Strongly disagree
2 – Disagree
3 – Undecided
4 – Agree
5 – Strongly Agree
1. I feel pessimistic that my anxiety problems could ever change for the better.
1

2

3

4

5

2. Even though I try, nothing seems to help with my anxiety.
1

2

3

4

5

3. It would be extremely difficult or impossible to solve my problems with anxiety.
1

2

3

4

5

4. I have had some positive experiences with being able to control my anxiety
through talking positively to myself.
1

2

3

4

5

5. My problems with anxiety are too severe to benefit from treatment.
1

2

3

4

5

6. Self-help methods may help others control their anxiety but they won’t work for
me.
1

2

3

4

5

7. I don’t believe I will ever feel truly relaxed and not worried.
1

2

3

4

5
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8. Facing my fears has never helped me to reduce my anxiety.
1

2

3

4

5

9. When I force myself to do something that scares me, often it's not as bad as I
thought.
1

2

3

4

5

10. I have had some success in reducing my anxiety.
1

2

3

4

5

11. There is very little anyone could do to help me solve my anxiety problems.
1

2

3

4

5

12. Even when I try to talk positively to myself, it doesn’t help my anxiety.
1

2

3

4

5

13. Positive thinking is helpful to me in managing my anxiety.
1

2

3

4

5

14. There is no solution to my anxiety problems.
1

2

3

4

5

15. I am optimistic that my anxiety can change for the better.
1

2

3

4

5

16. I have found that I can reduce my anxiety by telling myself to relax or by using
relaxation exercises.
1
2
3
4
5
17. I’ll never be able to control my anxiety and worry.
1

2

3

4

5

18. I believe it's quite possible for me to feel less worried and more relaxed.
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1

2

3

4

5

19. If I work hard, I can have a positive impact on my problems with anxiety.
1

2

3

4

5

20. There are factors contributing to my anxiety that I can learn to control.
1

2

3

4

5
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APPENDIX E
PERCEIVED EXPOSURE CONFIDENCE/HELPFULNESS SCALE (PECHS)
PECHS-Pre
In the space below list three situations involving people that you either avoid altogether
or endure with great anxiety. Make sure to list only those situations that provoke much
anxiety (at least 80 out of 100, with 100 being extreme anxiety). Common examples
include giving a presentation to a group, making conversation with a stranger, making
eye contact when you are nervous, avoiding parties, getting on a crowded bus, stating
an opinion, returning something at a store, etc.).
List three such situations in which you feel extremely afraid of being evaluated
negatively. For each situation, rate (1) how much you think putting yourself into each
particular situation (i.e., facing fear of that situation) would be helpful and (2) rate how
confident you personally would be that you could deliberately put yourself in that
situation
List Anxiety Provoking Situation:
1)
________________________________________________________________________
a) Anxiety rating (make sure it is at least 80 out of 100, with 100=extreme anxiety):
_______
b) Rate how much you think deliberately putting yourself in this situation would be
helpful in addressing your anxiety about people: _____________
1
Not at all helpful

100
Extremely Helpful

c) If you were asked to go out right now and put yourself in that situation, rate how
confident you are in this moment about your ability to put yourself in that situation,
__________
1
Not at all confident

100
Totally confident

List Anxiety Provoking Situation
2)
________________________________________________________________________
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a) Anxiety rating (make sure it is at least 80 out of 100, with 100=extreme anxiety):
______
b) Rate how much you think deliberately putting yourself in this situation would be
helpful in addressing your anxiety about people: _____________
1
Not at all helpful

100
Extremely Helpful

c) If you were asked to go out right now and put yourself in that situation, rate how
confident you are in this moment about your ability to put yourself in that situation,
__________
1
Not at all confident

100
Totally confident

List Anxiety Provoking Situation
3)
_______________________________________________________________________
a) Anxiety rating (make sure it is at least 80 out of 100, with 100=extreme anxiety):
_______
b) Rate how much you think deliberately putting yourself in this situation would be
helpful in addressing anxiety about people: _____________
1
Not at all helpful

100
Extremely Helpful

c) If you were asked to go out right now and put yourself in that situation, rate how
confident you are in this moment about your ability to put yourself in that situation,
__________
1
Not at all confident

100
Totally confident

PECHS-Post
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In the space below we have listed three anxiety-provoking situations you identified
earlier. For each situation, please re-rate (1) how much you think putting yourself into
each particular situation (i.e., facing fear of that situation) would be helpful and (2) rate
how confident you personally would be that you could deliberately put yourself in that
situation.
Anxiety Provoking Situation:
1) ____________________________________________________________________
a) Rate how much you think deliberately putting yourself in this situation would be
helpful in addressing your anxiety about people: _____________
1
Not at all helpful

100
Extremely Helpful

b) If you were asked to go out right now and put yourself in that situation, rate how
confident you are in this moment about your ability to put yourself in that
situation,__________
1
Not at all confident

100
Totally confident

Anxiety Provoking Situation
2) ___________________________________________________________________

a) Rate how much you think deliberately putting yourself in this situation would be
helpful in addressing your anxiety about people: _____________
1
Not at all helpful

100
Extremely Helpful

b) If you were asked to go out right now and put yourself in that situation, rate how
confident you are in this moment about your ability to put yourself in that
situation, __________
1
Not at all confident

100
Totally confident
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Anxiety Provoking Situation
3) ____________________________________________________________________
a) Rate how much you think deliberately putting yourself in this situation would be
helpful in addressing anxiety about people: _____________
1
Not at all helpful

100
Extremely Helpful

b) If you were asked to go out right now and put yourself in that situation, rate how
confident you are in this moment about your ability to put yourself in that
situation, __________
1
Not at all confident

100
Totally confident
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APPENDIX F
ADAPTED CREDIBILITY & EXPECTANCY QUESTIONNAIRE (CEQ)
We would like you to indicate below how much you believe, right now, that
psychotherapy would be helpful in reducing any psychological symptoms that you may
be experiencing. If you are currently in psychotherapy, please respond with your current
treatment in mind.
One item expectancy measure:
1. By the end of a course of therapy, how much improvement in your symptoms do you
think would occur?
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Credibility scale:
1. At this point, how logical does the therapy just presented to you seem?
1

2

3

4

not at all logical

5

6

7

8

somewhat logical

9
very logical

2. At this point, how successfully do you think the treatment just presented would be in
reducing your symptoms?
1

2

not at all useful

3

4

5
somewhat useful
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6

7

8

9
very useful

3. How confident would you be in recommending the treatment just presented to a
friend who experiences similar problems?
1

2

not at all confident

3

4

5

6

somewhat confident
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7

8

9

very confident

APPENDIX G
COUNSELOR RATING FORM – SHORT VERSION (CRF-S)
Below, each characteristic is followed by a seven-point scale that ranges from “not very”
to “very.” Please mark an “X” at the point on the scale that best represents how you
viewed the therapist in the video you just saw. For example:

FUNNY
not very

X :

:

:

:

:

:

very

:

X :

very

WELL DRESSED
not very

:

:

:

:

These ratings might show that the therapist did not joke around much, but was dressed
well. Though all of the following characteristics we ask you to rate are desirable,
therapists may differ in their strengths. We are interested in knowing how you view these
differences. This form is confidential and will not be shown to your counselor.

1.
not very

SINCERE
:

:

2.
not very

:

:

5.

:

:

very

:

:

:

:

very

:

:

very

:

:

very

HONEST
:

:

4.
not very

:

SKILLFUL

3.
not very

:

:

:

EXPERT
:

:

:

:

LIKABLE
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not very

:

:

6.
not very

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

very

:

:

:

:

very

:

:

:

:

very

:

:

:

:

very

:

:

:

:

very

:

:

very

:

:

very

PREPARED
:

:

12.
not very

:

RELIABLE

11.
not very

very

EXPERIENCED

10.
not very

:

TRUSTWORTHY

9.
not very

:

WARM

8.
not very

:

SOCIABLE

7.
not very

:

:

:

FRIENDLY
:

:

:
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APPENDIX H
BELIEFS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES SCALE (BAPS)
Please read the following statements and rate them using the scale provided. Record the
number that most accurately reflects your attitude toward seeking psychological help.

1 – Strongly disagree
2
3
4
5
6 – Strongly agree

____1. If a good friend asked my advice about a serious problem, I would recommend
that he/she see a psychologist.
____2. I would be willing to confide my intimate concerns to a psychologist.
____3. Seeing a psychologist is helpful when you are going through a difficult time.
____4. At some future time, I might want to see a psychologist.
____5. I would feel uneasy going to a psychologist because of what some people might
think.
____6. If I believed I were having a serious problem, my first inclination would be to see
a psychologist.
____7. Because of their training, psychologists can help you find solutions to your
problems.
____8. Going to a psychologist means that I am a weak person.
____9. Psychologists are good to talk to because they do not blame you for the mistakes
you have made.
____10. Having received help from a psychologist stigmatizes a person’s life.
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____11. There are certain problems that should not be discussed with a stranger such as a
psychologist.
____12. I would see a psychologist if I were worried or upset for a long period of time.
____13. Psychologists make people feel that they cannot deal with their problems.
____14. It is good to talk to someone like a psychologist because everything you say is
confidential.
____15. Talking about problems with a psychologist strikes me as a poor way to get rid
of emotional conflicts.
____16. Psychologists provide valuable advice because of their knowledge about human
behavior.
____17. It is difficult to talk about personal issues with highly educated people such as
psychologists.
____18. If I thought I needed psychological help, I would get this help no matter who
knew I was receiving assistance.
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APPENDIX I
INTERPERSONAL EXPOSURE FREQUENCY SCALE
At the experiment, you identified that__________________________________ was
something you avoided or endured with anxiety.
How often in the past two weeks did you deliberately put yourself in this situation in
order to help with your anxiety?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Never

Very often

At the experiment, you identified that__________________________________ was
something you avoided or endured with anxiety.
How often in the past two weeks did you deliberately put yourself in this situation in
order to help with your anxiety?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Never

Very often

At the experiment, you identified that__________________________________ was
something you avoided or endured with anxiety.
How often in the past two weeks did you deliberately put yourself in this situation in
order to help with your anxiety?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Never

7

8

9

10
Very often
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APPENDIX J
CBT REFERRAL LIST

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) Clinicians
IF THIS IS AN EMERGENCY
Call 911 or go to your local emergency room
1-800-273-TALK (1-800-273-8255)
Toll-free, 24-hour hotline of the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline

Timothy Hope, PhD

433 West Street, Suite 5
Amherst, MA 01002
(413) 315-4417

Joseph Mangine, PhD

48 N Pleasant St Suite 205
Amherst, MA 01002
(413) 253-0237

Edward Plimpton, PhD

256 N. Pleasant Street
Amherst, MA 01002
(413) 314-3182

Katherine Walsh, PhD,
LICSW

8 Trumbull Road
Northampton, MA 01060
(413) 418-3193

82

APPENDIX K
CLIENT MOTIVATION FOR THERAPY SCALE (CMOTS)
Imagine that you are currently involved in psychotherapy (or, if you are involved already,
rate with that treatment in mind). Please indicate to what extent each of the following items
corresponds to the reasons why you would be (or why you are) involved in therapy by
circling the appropriate number.
1 - Does not correspond at all
2
3
4 - Corresponds moderately
5
6
7 - Corresponds exactly

1. For the pleasure I would experience when I feel completely absorbed in
a therapy session.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. For the satisfaction I would have when I try to achieve my personal goals
in the course of therapy.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. Because I experience pleasure and satisfaction when I learn new
things about myself that I didn't know before.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. For the interest I have in understanding more about myself.
1

2

3

4

5

6
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APPENDIX L
BRIEF SYMPTOM INVENTORY (BSI)
Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have. Please read each
one carefully, and circle the number to the right that best describes HOW MUCH THAT
PROBLEM HAS DISTRESSED OR BOTHERED YOU DURING THE PAST 7 DAYS
(week), INCLUDING TODAY. Circle only one number for each problem and do not
skip any items. If you change your mind, erase your first mark carefully.
Not at

A little

Moder-

Quite a

HOW MUCH WERE YOU DISTRESSED BY:

all

Bit

ately

bit

Extremely

1. Nervousness or shakiness inside

0

1

2

3

4

2. Faintness or dizziness

0

1

2

3

4

3. The idea that someone else can control your
thoughts

0

1

2

3

4

4. Feeling others are to blame for most of your
troubles

0

1

2

3

4

5. Trouble remembering things

0

1

2

3

4

6. Feeling easily annoyed or irritated

0

1

2

3

4

7. Pains in heart or chest

0

1

2

3

4

8. Feeling afraid in open spaces or on the streets

0

1

2

3

4

9. Thoughts of ending your life

0

1

2

3

4

10. Feeling that most people cannot be trusted

0

1

2

3

4

11. Poor appetite

0

1

2

3

4

12. Suddenly scared for no reason

0

1

2

3

4

13. Temper outbursts that you could not control

0

1

2

3

4

14. Feeling lonely even when you are with
people

0

1

2

3

4
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15. Feeling blocked in getting things done

0

1

2

3

4

16. Feeling lonely

0

1

2

3

4

17. Feeling blue

0

1

2

3

4

18. Feeling no interest in things

0

1

2

3

4

19. Feeling fearful

0

1

2

3

4

20. Your feelings being easily hurt

0

1

2

3

4

21.Feelings that people are unfriendly or dislike
you

0

1

2

3

4

22. Feeling inferior to others

0

1

2

3

4

23. Nausea or upset stomach

0

1

2

3

4

24. Feeling that you are watched or talked about
by others

0

1

2

3

4

25. Trouble falling asleep

0

1

2

3

4

26. Having to check and double-check what you
do

0

1

2

3

4

27. Difficulty making decisions

0

1

2

3

4

28. Feeling afraid to travel on buses, subways,
or trains

0

1

2

3

4

29. Trouble getting your breath

0

1

2

3

4

30. Hot or cold spells

0

1

2

3

4

31. Having to avoid certain things, places, or
activities because they frighten you

0

1

2

3

4

32. Your mind going blank

0

1

2

3

4

33. Numbness or tingling in parts of your body

0

1

2

3

4

34. The idea that you should be punished for
your sins

0

1

2

3

4
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35. Feeling hopeless about the future

0

1

2

3

4

36. Trouble concentrating

0

1

2

3

4

37. Feeling weak in parts of your body

0

1

2

3

4

38. Feeling tense or keyed up

0

1

2

3

4

39. Thoughts of death or dying

0

1

2

3

4

40. Having urges to beat, injure, or harm
someone

0

1

2

3

4

41. Having urges to break or smash things

0

1

2

3

4

42. Feeling very self-conscious with others

0

1

2

3

4

43. Feeling uneasy in crowds

0

1

2

3

4

44. Never feeling close to another person

0

1

2

3

4

45. Spells of terror or panic

0

1

2

3

4

46. Getting into frequent arguments

0

1

2

3

4

47. Feeling nervous when you are left alone

0

1

2

3

4

48. Others not giving you proper credit for your
achievements

0

1

2

3

4

49. Feeling so restless you couldn’t sit still

0

1

2

3

4

50. Feelings of worthlessness

0

1

2

3

4

51. Feeling that people will take advantage of
you if you let them

0

1

2

3

4

52. Feelings of guilt

0

1

2

3

4

53. The idea that something is wrong with your
mind

0

1

2

3

4
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APPENDIX M
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULE (PANAS)
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.

1 – Very slightly or not at all
2 – A little
3 – Moderately
4 – Quite a bit
5 – Extremely

___

interested

___

irritable

___

distressed

___

alert

___

excited

___

ashamed

___

upset

___

inspired

___

strong

___

nervous

___

guilty

___

determined

___

scared

___

attentive

___

hostile

___

jittery

___

enthusiastic

___

active

___

proud

___

afraid
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APPENDIX N
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND CHANGE ASSESSMENT (URICA)
ACTION SUBSCALE
Each statement below describes how a person might feel when starting therapy or
approaching problems in their lives. Please indicate the extent to which you tend to agree
or disagree with each statement. In each case, make your choice in terms of how you feel
right now, not what you have felt in the past or would like to feel. For all statements that
refer to your “problem,” answer in terms of problems related to social anxiety.
There are five possible responses to each of the items in the questionnaire:
1 - Strongly Disagree
2 - Disagree
3 - Undecided
4 - Agree
5 - Strongly Agree

Circle the number that best describes how much you agree or disagree with each
statement.
1. I am doing something about the social anxiety that had been bothering me.
1

2

3

4

5

4

5

2. I am finally doing some work on my problem.
1

2

3

3. At times my social anxiety is difficult, but I’m working on it.
1

2

3

4

5

3

4

5

4. I am really working hard to change.
1

2
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5. Even though I’m not always successful in changing, I am at least working on my
social anxiety.
1

2

3

4

5

6. I have started working on my social anxiety, but I would like help.
1

2

3

4

5

7. Anyone can talk about changing, I’m actually doing something about it.
1

2

3

4

5

3

4

5

8. I am actively working on my problem.
1

2
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APPENDIX O
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Please indicate your answers to the following items.
1. Age: _____
2. Sex:
Male
Female
3. Ethnicity (select all that apply):
Black/Afro-Caribbean/African
Asian (e.g., South Asian, East Asian, Southeast Asian)
White/European
Hispanic/Latin American
Native American or Alaska Native
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
Biracial/multiracial
Other (specify ____________________)
4. Year in college:
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th or higher
5. Average annual family household income (check the category that best applies):
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Less than $25, 000
$25,001 - $50,000
$50,001 - $75, 000
$75, 001 - $100, 000
$100, 001 - $125, 000
$125, 001 - $150, 000
$150, 001 - $175, 000
$175, 001 - $200, 000
$200,001+
6. Marital status:
Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
7. Student/occupational status:
Full-time student, not employed
Full-time student, employed part-time
Full-time student, employed full-time
Part-time student, not employed
Part-time student, employed part-time
Part-time student, employed full-time
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APPENDIX P
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOCIAL ANXIETY
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements, using the scale
provided:
1 - Strongly disagree
2 - Disagree
3 - Somewhat disagree
4 - Neutral/no opinion
5 - Somewhat agree
6 - Agree
7 - Strongly agree

1. I believe that my tendency to become anxious in social situations is related to
biological factors, such as the chemicals in my brain.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. I believe that my tendency to become anxious in social situations is related to
interpersonal factors, such as difficulty relating to those around me.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. I believe that my tendency to become anxious in social situations is related to my
own thoughts or beliefs, such thinking that I will say something stupid.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. I believe that my tendency to become anxious in social situations is related to my
emotions, such as difficulty regulating my emotional reactions when around
others.

1

2

3

4

5
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APPENDIX Q
PSYCHOTHERAPY HISTORY
Please indicate your answers to the following items.
1. Are you currently in psychotherapy for any psychological difficulties?
Yes
No
If Yes, please answer item 2. If No, please skip to and answer item 3.
2. How satisfied are you with your current treatment for any psychological
difficulties?
1 – Very satisfied
2 – Satisfied
3 – Somewhat satisfied
4 – Neutral/ no opinion
5 – Somewhat dissatisfied
6 – Dissatisfied
7 – Very Dissatisfied
3. Are you actively considering psychotherapy for any psychological difficulties?
Yes
No
4. Are you currently in psychotherapy for social anxiety concerns?
Yes
No
If Yes, please answer item 5. If No, please skip to and answer item 6.
5. How satisfied are you with your current treatment for social anxiety concerns?
1 – Very satisfied
2 – Satisfied
3 – Somewhat satisfied
4 – Neutral/ no opinion
5 – Somewhat dissatisfied
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6 – Dissatisfied
7 – Very Dissatisfied
6. Are you actively considering psychotherapy for social anxiety concerns?
Yes
No
7. Have you ever been in psychotherapy before for any psychological difficulties?
Yes
No
If yes, please answer items 8 and 9.
8. How many times have you previously been in psychotherapy for any
psychological difficulties (separate courses of treatment)?
_____
9. On average, how satisfied have you been with your psychotherapy experience(s)
for any psychological difficulties?
1 – Very satisfied
2 – Satisfied
3 – Somewhat satisfied
4 – Neutral/ no opinion
5 – Somewhat dissatisfied
6 – Dissatisfied
7 – Very Dissatisfied
10. Have you ever been in psychotherapy before for social anxiety concerns?
Yes
No
If yes, please answer items 8 and 9.
11. How many times have you previously been in psychotherapy for social anxiety
concerns (separate courses of treatment)?
_____
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12. On average, how satisfied have you been with your psychotherapy experience(s)
for social anxiety concerns?
1 – Very satisfied
2 – Satisfied
3 – Somewhat satisfied
4 – Neutral/ no opinion
5 – Somewhat dissatisfied
6 – Dissatisfied
7 – Very Dissatisfied
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